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L Introduction
Over two million passengers travel by air each day in the United States,2
making airline travel a vital part of our modem society. The ready availability
and low cost of flights to locations both within the United States and abroad
provide the American public with an efficient, convenient, and relatively
inexpensive form of travel.' Americans can board one of the thousands of
2. See Congressional Briefing on the Office of National Risk Assessment (ONRA) and
the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening (CAPPS I) Program, 108th Cong. (2003)
(statement of Ben H. Bell, 111, Director, Office of National Risk Assessment of the
Transportation Security Administration), at http://www.acte.org/initiatives/CAPPS_11_Congress
Briefing.pdf (March 7, 2003) [hereinafter Bell Briefing] (discussing the number of airline
travelers each day in the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See World Tourism Statistics 2000-2002, at http://www.trentu.ca/anthropology/anth
409h/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2004) ("Between 1978-1998, the real cost of air travel
fell by 35 percent .... A thousand miles of air travel now requires 61 less work hours than it
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flights departing from airports around the country each day4 and travel
hundreds of miles for business meetings, vacations, or visits with family and
friends in only a matter of hours. Passengers can board a plane in Los Angeles
and be in New York City in six hours5 or in Honolulu in a little over five
hours.6 Other forms of transportation provide neither the expediency nor the
convenience of airline travel. For example, the approximate driving time from
New York to Los Angeles is more than forty-one hours,7 and an Amtrak train
scheduled to leave New York at 2:50 p.m. on Monday afternoon will not arrive
in Los Angeles until 8:20 a.m. on Thursday, almost sixty-nine hours later.'
Yet, as much as Americans have come to rely on the ease and efficiency of
airline travel, the government's response to the tragic events of September 11,
2001 (September 11) threatens to limit the public's ability to travel by air.
On September 11, nineteen hijackers flew two planes into the World
Trade Center, causing the collapse of both towers and killing over 2800
people. 9 The hijackers flew a third plane into the Pentagon, causing an
did a generation ago.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See, e.g., CITY OF CtICAGO, Monthly Operations, Passengers, Cargo Summary by
Class for December 2002, 3, at http://www.ohare.con/doa/stats/1202.pdf (Feb. 13, 2003)
(listing the number of domestic air carrier flights at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport in
2002 as 676,504) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); DFW Operations
Statistics December, 2003, at http://www.dfwairport.com/stats/03/12/operations-dec03.xls (last
visited March 2, 2004) (listing the number of domestic air carrier flights at Dallas/Fort Worth
International Airport in 2002 as 496,200) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Monthly Air Traffic Report, December, 2002, 4, at http://www.atlantaairport.com/sublevels
/airport-info/pdfs/Traffic/200212.pdf (last visited March 2, 2004) (listing the number of
domestic air carrier flights at Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in 2002 as
610,509) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See New York City: Smart Travel Tips, at http://www.fodors.com/miniguides
/mgresults.cfln?destination=new_yorkcity@l II &cur section=tra (last visited Feb. 24,2004)
(providing approximate flight times from several destinations to New York City) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See Honolulu & 0'ahu: Smart Travel Tips, at http://www.fodors.com/miniguides
/mgresults.cfm?destination=honolulu_oahu@75&cur _section=tra (last visited Feb. 24, 2004)
(listing approximate flight times to Honolulu from several destinations) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Driving Directions, at http://www.mid
atlantic.com/travel/triptik.asp (last visited March 2, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
8. AMTRAK, Departure and Return Options, at http://tickets.amtrak.com/Amtrak
/availability (last visited March 2, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. Compare September 11, 2001 Victims, WTC Statistics, at http://www.september
I 1 victims.com/septemberl I victims/wtc statistics.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004) (listing the
number of victims at the World Trade Center as 2824) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review) with Phil Hirschkorn, New York reduces 9/11 death toll by 40, at http://www.
cnn.com/2003[US/Northeast/l0/29/wtc.deaths/index.htm (Oct. 29, 2003) (stating that 2752
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additional 184 deaths, and a fourth plane crashed in western Pennsylvania,
killing all forty passengers and crew members on board.'0 The hijackers
turned the four commercial airliners into weapons of mass destruction,
proving that airline security was no longer only a matter of safeguarding the
flying public, but it was also a matter of protecting national security." The
events of September 11 changed the course of America's history and
encouraged the nation's leaders to reassess the balance between civil liberties
and the security of the nation.
In a press conference on the night of September 11, Secretary of Health
and Human Services, Tommy G. Thompson, began his remarks by stating
that "[e]very single American lost something today."' 2  As much as
Americans lost on September 11, the extent of the liberties we stand to lose
as a result of legislation and regulations enacted in the wake of September 11
remains to be seen. As Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote:
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of
urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. The
World War II relocation-camp cases, ... and the Red Scare and
McCarthy-era internal subversion cases... are only the most extreme
reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in
the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it.'
3
Indeed, the discord between civil liberties and national security that has
surfaced in the post-September 11 era, with the passage of bills such as the
USA PATRIOT Act 4 and the enforcement of government policies that call
people were killed at the World Trade Center in the September 1I attacks) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Sources disagree on the exact number of people killed in
the World Trade Center attacks. Rebecca Blackmon Joyner, Note, An Old Lawfor New World?
Third-Party Liability for Terrorist Acts--From the Klan to.Al Qaeda, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 427,
461 n. 281 (2003).
10. See Phil Hirschkom, New York adjusts terrorist death toll downward, at http://www.
cnn.com/2002/US/08/22/91 I.toll/ (Aug. 22, 2002) (listing the death tolls at the September II,
2001 attack sites) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
1i. See 147 CoNG. REc. S9583 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kerry)
("[A]irport security is also a matter of national security.").
12. Press Briefing by Attorney General, Secretary of HHS, Secretary of Transportation,
and FEMA Director (statement of Secretary Thompson), at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911*%2D10.html (Sept. !1, 2001) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
14. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
[hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]. See infra note 21 for a discussion ofthe USA PATRIOT Act.
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for the indefinite detention of enemy combatants and increased surveillance
of American citizens, 5 is not a new phenomenon. In the midst of the Civil
War, Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus.' 6 During World
War I, the courts permitted restrictions on the freedom of expression and
prosecuted many foreigners living in the United States because of their
suspected political views.17 The government interned over 100,000 Japanese-
Americans during World War II, stripping them of their homes and their
freedom.' 8 In the 1950s, Congress, led by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy,
sought to rid the nation of persons with suspected Communist ties. 19 In
hindsight, these severe restrictions on the civil liberties of United States
citizens are unsightly blemishes on the record of a country that was founded
on the ideals of democracy and freedom. As Senator Russ Feingold stated on
the Senate floor in October 2001, "We must not allow this piece of our past
to become prologue. . . We will lose [the war against terrorism] without a
shot being fired if we sacrifice the liberties of the American people in the
belief that by doing so we will stop the terrorists."
20
In the rush to enact legislation during the months immediately following
September 11, Congress seemed to pay little attention to the words of Senator
Feingold and instead consistently placed national security ahead of protecting
the civil liberties of Americans.2' Certainly, it was the rising concern for
15. See generally DAVID COLE, ENEmy AUENs: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERROISM (2003) (arguing that the government has
infringed upon the civil liberties of citizens and noncitizens with post-September I I policies).
16. See Diane P. Wood, The Rule ofL aw in Times ofStress, 70 U. O. L. REV. 455,460
(2003) (noting that Lincoln suspended habeas corpus during the Civil War).
17. See COLE, supra note 15, at 8 (explaining that during the "Palmer Raids," the
government "round[ed] up thousands of foreign nationals for their suspected political
associations").
18. See Alan Brinkley, A Familiar Story: Lessons from Past Assaults on Freedoms, in
THE WAR ON OuR FREEDOMS 23, 40-42 (Richard C. Leone & Oreg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003)
(describing the Japanese internment during World War i).
19. See Wood, supra note 16, at 463 (discussing the anti-Communist campaign waged by
Senator McCarthy).
20. 147 CONG. REC. SI0,570 (daily ed. Oct. II, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
21. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act ("An Act To deter and punish terrorist acts in the
United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for
other purposes."). On October 26, 2001, just six weeks after the September II attacks,
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act "with practically no debate over its potentially
disastrous impact on civil liberties." Kevin Bankston & Megan E. Gray, Government
Surveillance and Data Privacy Issues: Foundations and Developments, PRIVACY & INFO L.
REP., Apr. 2003, at 1, 3. Bankston and Gray argue that in passing the USA PATRIOT Act,
"Congress vastly expanded the government's authority to spy on its own citizens while
simultaneously weakening thejudicial oversight needed to prevent abuse of that authority." Id.
1389
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1385 (2004)
safeguarding national security that served as an impetus for enacting
legislation aimed at increasing airport security. 22  In response to the
September 1 1 terror attacks, Congress enacted the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act 23 and the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA),24 statutes that federalized all airport screening services.
25
Although the ATSA may not have restricted civil liberties on its face, at least
one program implemented under the mandates of that act has sparked
widespread debate about its restrictions on civil liberties.26
The USA PATRIOT Act enables the FBI to monitor Internet activity of suspected
terrorists, see NAT H ENTOFF, THE WAR ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE GATHERING RESISTANCE
11-12, 43-49 (2003) (explaining that the USA PATRIOT Act allows the FBI to plant
surveillance devices on computers), and the Department of Justice to hold "enemy combatants"
without charging them with a crime or providing them with an attorney. See generally COLE,
supra note 15 (discussing the treatment of enemy combatants in the aftermath of September I1).
In February 2004, the Supreme Court upheld provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act by denying
an enemy combatant being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the opportunity to meet with an
attorney. Gherebi v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 1353, 1353 (2004); see Bill Mears, Court keeps Gitmo
detainee from seeing lawyer, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/05/scotus.gitmo.detainee
/index.html (Feb. 18, 2004) (discussing the Gherebi case) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). In June 2004, the Court upheld the government's ability to detain enemy
combatants at Guantanamo Bay for the duration of active hostilities during the war on terrorism,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2004), but also ruled that the men and women being
detained had a right to challenge the legality of their detention in a United States Court. See id.
at 2648 (finding that an enemy combatant "must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decisionmaker"); see also Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2699 (2004) (stating that
federal courts have jurisdiction to hear enemy combatants' challenges to the legality of their
detention before a United States court).
22. A brief glance at the nation's recent history shows that following disasters involving
commercial aircraft, the government often reacts by imposing legislation aimed at increasing
airline security. See, e.g., Heather E. Reser, Comment, Airline Terrorism: The Effect of
Tightened Security on the Right to Travel, 63 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 819, 829-30 (1998) (explaining
that Congress passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 after the bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103); Jamie L. Rhee, Comment, Rational and Constitutional Approaches to Airline
Safety in the Face of Terrorist Threats, 49 DEPAuL L. REv. 847, 854 (2000) (describing the
creation of the Gore Commission to study aviation security following the crash of TWA Flight
800).
23. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat.
230 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
24. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
25. Id. § 101, 115 Stat. at 597; see David T. Norton, Recent Developments in Aviation
Law, 67 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1107, 1117-19 (2002) (discussing the Air Transportation Safety and
Stabilization Act and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act).
26. See Sarah Kehaulani Goo, Fliers to Be Rated for Risk Level.: New System Will
Scrutinize Each Passenger, Assign Color Code, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2003, at Al (noting that
CAPPS II "has sparked so much controversy among both liberal and conservative groups that
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Section 136 of the ATSA mandated the creation of enhanced passenger
screening programs at all United States airports.27 One such program, the
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), has already
been tested in several airports28 and was originally scheduled to be
implemented by the end of 2004.29 As originally conceived, the CAPPS II
System was designed to screen all passengers boarding commercial aircraft
using a two-step process,30 first verifying the passengers' identification
information using commercial databases, and then conducting a risk
assessment by comparing the passengers' information to classified federal
databases,?
From the CAPPS II System's conception, civil liberties advocates
expressed concerns that the System would increase the number of people
mistakenly detained at airports under the current screening system without
increasing the number of terrorists apprehended through the screening
32process. Additionally, these advocates were concerned that the CAPPS II
System treated every passenger like a terror suspect.33 Pressure from privacy
the TSA has struggled to get it going").
27. See infra note 53 and accompanying text (quoting section 136 of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act that mandated the creation of a system that screened all airline
passengers).
28. See Gregory P. Cirillo & Christopher M. Mills, New Air Traveler Prescreening
System Raises Privacy Concerns, METROPOLITAN CORP. CouNs., July 2003, at 13, WL 7/03
METCC 13, (col. 1) (explaining that Delta Airlines tested CAPPS II at three airports beginning
March 2003).
29. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Undersecretary Hutchinson's
Remarks at a CAPPS II Media Roundtable, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?
content=-3166 (Feb. 13, 2004) (explaining that the agency plans to implement testing of the
program before the end of 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
30. See Notice of status of system of records; Interim final notice; Request for further
comments, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,265, 45,266 (Aug. 1, 2003) [hereinafter August I Notice]
(describing the CAPPS II screening process).
31. Id.
32. See Ann Davis, Boarding Impasse: Why a 'No Fly List 'Aimed at Terrorists Often
Delays Others, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2003, at A14 ("Privacy and civil-liberties advocates
fear... that [increasing the number of databases searched] will result in even more passengers
being wrongly tagged."). Under the current screening system, passengers' identities are
compared to a "No Fly" list, which contains a database of persons with suspected ties to terrorist
organizations. See Eric Lichtblau, Government's 'No Fly' List is Challenged in a Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2003, at A17 (describing the "No Fly" lists). The Federal Bureau of
Investigation and federal transportation agencies created the "No Fly" list following the
September II terror attacks. Id.
33. See Matthew L. Wald, Government Is 'Reshaping'Airport Screening System, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2004, at A21 (quoting an ACLU official as stating that they did not want the
government to use the CAPPS II System to help turn the United States "into a society where
everybody is treated like a suspect and everybody is investigated").
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advocacy groups prompted the Bush Administration to send the CAPPS II
System back to the drawing board in July, 2004. 34 The changes in the
original CAPPS II System, which were announced in August, 2004, primarily
related to the protection of passengers' privacy interests and included
changes in the first stage of the CAPPS II System risk assessment, the
identity verification process."a The Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) states that the redesigned system, which the government renamed
Secure Flight, will continue to use commercial databases to verify the
identities of passengers, but will no longer use algorithms in the verification
process and will no longer scan the passenger lists for violent criminals.36
There is no indication that the TSA is contemplating any changes to the
redress procedures for passengers who are erroneously detained by the
redesigned CAPPS II System.
This Note contends that the redress procedures that the TSA currently
plans to provide to erroneously detained passengers, under both the original
and redesigned Systems, fail to adequately safeguard passengers'
constitutionally protected liberty and property interests. Part II of this Note
will explain the CAPPS II System, the changes expected under the Secure
Flight Program, and the redress procedures that the government will make
available to passengers who are mistakenly identified as security risk.3' Also,
Part II will contend that because the government does not make the data used
in conducting the risk assessments available to passengers contesting their
assessment, the redress procedures provide little protection for the
passengers' affected interests.
Part III of this Note provides a constitutional background for the
analyses conducted in Parts IV and V and explains the framework for
identifying what, if any, procedural due process protections are required
before the government may deprive citizens of a constitutionally protected
34. See, e.g., Leslie Miller, New passenger screening plan not ready to fly, Cn. SUN-
TIMES, July 14, 2004, at 46, 2004 WL 63149361 (explaining that although the TSA chief did
not say what prompted the decision to reshape the CAPPS if System, he did indicate that
"privacy concerns were involved").
35. See Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Airport Screening System Touted as Improvement, WASH.
POST, Aug. 27, 2004, at E3 (explaining the changes the government is implementing under the
redesigned CAPPS II System).
36. See id. (same). The government's announcement that it will continue to use
commercial databases when verifying passengers' identities is a departure from earlier
announcements that the redesigned System would not use commercial databases. See, e.g.,
Wald, supra note 33, at A21 (explaining that although "[t]he government is backing away from
a plan to use commercial databases" in the CAPPS I1 System, the government "is pressing ahead
with a new computer system that will rely on government databases").
37. See infra Part 11 (explaining the CAPPS II System).
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interest. Part IV applies the first step of this framework. Relying on the
right to travel jurisprudence, Part IV contends that airline passengers have a
judicially cognizable liberty interest in the right to air travel. Part IV further
contends that passengers maintain a judicially cognizable property interest in
their purchased airline ticket and reserved seat.
Part V applies the Mathews v. Eldridge38 balancing test in order to
address the second step of the framework. Part V weighs the interests of the
passengers against the interests of the government, in light of the risk of
erroneous deprivation and the probable value of any additional procedural
safeguards. First, Part V outlines the fundamental nature of passengers'
interest in travel within the United States, their liberty interest in international
travel, and their property interest in their purchased ticket and seat. Second,
Part V discusses passengers' high risk of erroneous deprivation under the
government's currently planned redress procedures and contends that the
inclusion of additional safeguards would significantly reduce that risk.
Finally, Part V addresses the government's substantial interest in
safeguarding the nation's security but concludes that the government's
interest would not be unduly burdened by certain additional procedural
safeguards.
This Note concludes by recommending three procedural safeguards that
should be implemented before the redesigned CAPPS II System is launched
in American airports. These safeguards, if implemented, would adequately
protect the liberty and property interests of red-coded passengers, those
passengers forbidden from flying. First, the government should conduct
additional risk assessments of those passengers who were identified as a high
risk to aviation security during the initial assessment. Second, the
government should provide these passengers with predeprivation notice prior
to their arrival at the airport. Finally, the government should provide red-
coded passengers with a postdeprivation hearing and an opportunity to
challenge the evidence against them. 3
38. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319(1976). See infra Parts III and V for a discussion
of Mathews.
39. The arguments presented in this Note, particularly those in Part V, are limited by the
ongoing development of the redesigned CAPPS II System. However, all indications show that
the government plans to implement the new System, even with the passengers' limited ability to
access and correct erroneous information. These indications will guide the arguments offered in
the following pages. This Note seeks only to determine whether the redesigned CAPPS i1
System provides adequate procedural due process safeguards to protect the civil liberties and
property interests of erroneously detained passengers.
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II. The Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II)
and Secure Flight
Beginning in late 1997, commercial airline carriers implemented the first
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), an automated
computer system developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
screen airline passengers. The original CAPPS System, managed by the
FAA, gathered information about passengers and assessed whether a
particular passenger represented a security threat.4 1 The System did not scan
any government or law enforcement databases, 42 but instead identified high-
risk passengers by assessing behavioral characteristics, 43 looking for
suspicious itineraries and purchasing patterns,44 and comparing information
about the passengers' identities to a watch list for suspected terrorists.4 5 The
System selected passengers with a high-risk profile46 and applied extra
security procedures to the luggage of the high-risk passengers. In addition
40. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transportation, DOT Investigates Passenger Security
Screening's Impact on Minorities, at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot5501.htm (June 4, 2001)
[hereinafter DOT Press Release] ("CAPPS was adopted by DOT's Federal Aviation
Administration in late 1997 in response to a recommendation of the White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. See Ellen Baker, Comment, Flying While Arab-Racial Profiling and Air Travel
Security, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1375, 1379 (2002) (describing the procedure for screening
passengers).
42. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Review of FAA
Passenger Screening Proposal Concludes It Won't Discriminate Against Airline Travelers, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/i 997/October97/413cr.html (Oct. 1, 1997) ("CAPS [sic] will not
prompt the gathering of any additional information by the federal government or air carriers,
and is not connected to any law enforcement or national security database.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITrEES,
AVIATION SECURITY: COMPUTER-ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM FACES
SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES, GAO-04-385, at 6 (Feb. 2004) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT] (explaining the CAPPS 11 System), available at http://wwwgao.gov/new.items/
d04385.pdf. The CAPPS II rules used in assessing the risk level of passengers are "behavioral
characteristics used to select passengers who require additional security scrutiny." Id. at 6 n.5.
44. See Sharon Begley, Will We Ever Be Safe Again?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at 58,
60 (explaining the screening process of the CAPPS System). Under the original CAPPS
System, security officials often flagged passengers who purchased open tickets or paid cash for
one-way tickets. See id. (stating that security personnel may view open ticket purchases as
suspicious).
45. GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 6.
46. See Bankston & Gray, supra note 21, at 8-9 (describing how the CAPPS System
selected passengers). Bankston and Gray also note that the specifics of the CAPPS files are
confidential. Id. at 9.
47. See Baker, supra note 41, at 1379 (explaining that the intent of the original CAPPS
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to identifying high-risk passengers for additional screening, the System also
randomly selected other passengers to undergo additional screening measures.
48
Following the events of September 11, Congress determined that the
original CAPPS System was inadequate, 49 and that all passengers must be
screened in order to thoroughly assess any terrorist threats that could endanger
commercial airline flights.50 In November 2001, Congress enacted the
ATSA, 51 which created the TSA and granted the federal government full
control over aviation security.52 In the Act, Congress mandated:
The Secretary of Transportation shall ensure that the Computer-Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System, or any successor system-
(i) is used to evaluate all passengers before they board an aircraft; and
(ii) includes procedures to ensure that individuals selected by the system
and their carry-on and checked baggage are adequately screened. 53
In response to this mandate, the TSA, while still under the auspices of the
Department of Transportation, issued a "Notice to amend a system of records"
on January 15, 2003 (January 15 Notice). 54 In this Notice, the TSA proposed
to establish a system of records to support a new version of the Computer-
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, CAPPS II.s5 The Notice stated that
program was to screen only the checked baggage of passengers whom security officials
identified as posing a security risk).
48. See DOT Press Release, supra note 40 (stating that CAPPS would also randomly
identify passengers whose bags would be subject to search).
49. Under the original CAPPS System, security officials provided additional screening
only for those passengers whom the System either identified as a high risk or selected randomly.
Security officials allowed all other passengers to board the aircraft after simply walking through
a metal detector. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 5-6 (describing CAPPS's screening
process).
50. See infra note 53 and accompanying text (quoting Section 136 of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, which requires that any passenger screening system implemented at
U.S. airports must assess all passengers); see also Bell Briefing, supra note 2 (explaining that
Congress required the passenger screening system to screen all passengers).
51. Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-71,115 Stat. 597
(2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
52. Id. § 101, 115 Stat. at 597; see also Kent C. Krause, Putting the Transportation
Security Administration in Historical Context, 68 J. Ant L. & CoM. 233, 244 (Spring 2003)
(explaining that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act established "full-time federal
control over aviation security through creation of the Transportation Security Administration").
53. Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 136, 115
Stat. 597, 637 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
54. Notice to amend a system of records, 68 Fed. Reg. 2101 (Jan. 15, 2003) [hereinafter
January 15 Notice].
55. See id. at 2102 (stating that the TSA will use the system of records for screening
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the records would "be used to facilitate the conduct of an aviation security-
screening program, including risk assessments to ensure aviation security."0
6
Although the TSA has described CAPPS II as "an enhanced system to confirm
the -identities of passengers and identify foreign terrorists or persons with
terrorist connections before they board U.S. aircraft,"07 the January 15 Notice
failed to provide any definitive information on the new CAPPS II System.
Instead, the Notice addressed only the types and manner of information that the
System would use in conducting the risk assessments and the categories of
records that would be affected.58 The January 15 Notice clarified that the risk
assessment would be based on information provided by the passengers,
reservation information from the airports, risk assessment reports, and law
enforcement and intelligence information. 9
The TSA received a significant number of comments concerning the
January 15 Notice,W prompting the agency to make considerable changes to the
proposed System.6' On August 1, 2003, the TSA issued an interim final notice
(August 1 Notice) concerning the CAPPS II System 62 that better outlined the
System and how it would be used by the government to conduct risk
assessments on all "passengers traveling by air to, from or within the United
States."63 In addition to identifying passengers as terrorist risks, the August 1
Notice stated that the CAPPS II System may be used for other purposes in the
future, such as identifying persons with outstanding arrest warrants and
submitting their information to the appropriate authorities.6
airline passengers).
56. Id.
57. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Transportation Security
Administration, TSA's CAPPS 11 Gives Equal Weight to Privacy Security, at
http://www.tsa.gov/public/displaytheme=44&content=250 (March 1I, 2003) [hereinafter
Privacy Press Release] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. See January 15 Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 2102 (listing the categories of records that
would be held in the new system of records and also describing persons or entities to whom the
information contained in the system may be disclosed).
59. Id. at 2102.
60. See August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,265, 45,265 (Aug. 1, 2003) (stating that
"substantial comments were received in response to the prior Privacy Act notice").
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 45,266.
64. See id. ("After the CAPPS II system becomes operational, it is contemplated that
information regarding persons with outstanding state or federal arrest warrants for crimes of
violence may also be analyzed and applied in the context of this system."); see also Press
Release, Dep't of Homeland Security, Undersecretary Hutchinson's Remarks at a CAPPS 1I
Media Roundtable, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display~content=3166 (last visited Aug. 1,
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The August 1 Notice explained in much greater detail than the previous
Notice how the System will screen each passenger.6 To verify the identity of a
passenger, the government will use the data collected from the passenger
66reservation system. This System will contain the passenger name record
(PNR) that is assigned to each passenger when they purchase an airline ticket.67
A passenger's PNR will contain the passenger's name, address, telephone
number, and date of birth, as well as the passenger's itinerary.6 The System
would compare a passenger's PNR to databases maintained by commercial data
providers 69 in order to verify the passenger's identity 70 and then conduct a risk
assessment of each passenger, searching within the government's national
security and other classified databases for known terrorists or any connection to
terrorist activities or groups.7'
2004) (stating that CAPPS 11 will identify violent criminals with outstanding warrants) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Under the redesigned CAPPS 11 System, the TSA
eliminated the component that would compare passengers' information against criminal
databases. See O'Harrow, Jr., supra note 35, at E3 (explaining that the new Secure Flight
System will not scan passenger lists for violent criminals).
65. See August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,266 (explaining how the system will first
verify a passenger's identity and then conduct a risk assessment on each passenger).
66. Id.
67. See Bankston & Gray, supra note 21, at 9 (stating that airlines, travel agencies, and
computerized airline reservations systems maintain PNRs).
68. August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,266; see also Bankston& Gray, supra note 21, at
9 (explaining that PNRs can be "particularly revealing" as they can show your travel
companion(s), whether you shared a hotel room on your trip, and even what food you ate while
traveling). Government officials state that the revised CAPPS 11 System may still require
passengers to submit their name, address, telephone number, and date of birth. See Wald, supra
note 33, at A21 (stating that a government official explained that the revised system may still
require passengers to submit this information).
69. Commercial databases compile public records and consumer data on U.S. residents.
These databases are frequently used by credit card companies and cell phone providers to verify
the identity and credit record of the applicant or purchaser. See USAToday.com, Government
scours commercial databases for terror suspects, at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/
techinnovations/2003-04-14-database-search x.htm (Apr. 14, 2003) (describing commercial
databases) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The TSA plans to use three
primary databases to verify passengers' identities: Acxiom Corporation, ChoicePoint, and
LexisNexis Group. See O'Harrow, Jr., supra note 35, at E3 (listing the databases that the TSA
plans to use).
70. See August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,266 (stating that the CAPPS 11 System will
send the information from a passenger's PNR to commercial databases to verify the identity of
the passenger); see also Privacy Press Release, supra note 57 (explaining that "CAPPS 11 will
receive scores generated from commercial databases" to verify a passenger's identity).
71. See August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,266 (stating that the assessment will
determine the probability that the passenger is a terrorist or has ties to a terrorist group by using
"national security information from within the Federal Government" and other classified
information).
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After the System completes the risk assessment, it will assign each
passenger a color code-green, yellow, or red72-and transfer the information
to the ticket counter when the passenger checks in for his flight.73 The System
will assign a color code of green to those passengers identified as "low risk,"
and those passengers may proceed to their flight with no extra security
checks.74 Passengers who are flagged as having an "elevated, uncertain or
'unknown risk' of terrorism, 75 are color-coded yellow. 76  Passengers that
receive a yellow code will be subject to additional scrutiny77 but may board the
flight as soon as they clear the heightened security measures. 78
The passengers whom the System identifies as presenting a high risk of
potential terrorist activity will be assigned a red code. 79 Red-coded passengers
will not be subjected to additional screening-which would allow them to
embark on their flight after clearing the extra security measures-but instead
will be barred from boarding the plane.80 Additionally, the airlines or the TSA
will hand the names of the red-coded passengers over to appropriate law
enforcement officials, thus subjecting the passengers to police questioning and
possible arrest.8 ' The TSA estimates that of the over two million passengers
72. See Bell Briefing, supra note 2 ("Once the analysis is completed, a red, yellow, or
green classification will be provided in the system."); August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,266
(explaining that "each traveling passenger will be identified with a 'risk score,' indicating
whether that person's information leads to a determination of low, high, or unknown risk to
passenger and aviation security").
73. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 6-7 (explaining the risk assessment process).
74. See Bell Briefing, supra note 2 (explaining that "green" passengers may proceed to the
gate without any extra scrutiny); August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,266 (stating that low-risk
passengers "will simply pass through the ordinary airport security screening process to their
flights").
75. August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,266.
76. See Bell Briefing, supra note 2 (noting that a "yellow" passenger will be subject to
greater security than will "green" passengers).
77. Id.; see also August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,266 (explaining that passengers with
an "elevated, uncertain, or 'unknown risk' of terrorism.., will be subjected to heightened
security screening prior to boarding their flights").
78. August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,266.
79. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 7 (stating that "[p]assengers whose risk
assessment is determined to be unacceptable will not be issued boarding passes").
80. See Goo, supra note 26, at Al (stating that security officials will not allow red-coded
passengers to board their flight); see also Bell Briefing, supra note 2 ("'Red' assessments are
referred to law enforcement."); August 1 Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,266 (explaining that the
TSA will refer high risk passengers to law enforcement officials).
81. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 7 (stating that law enforcement officials will
determine whether to subject passengers to additional questioning or arrest).
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within the United States who travel by air each day,8 2 the System will red-code
one to two percent of these passengers.8 3 Thus, even under a revised System,
as many as 20,000 to 40,000 passengers may be red-coded and prevented from
boarding their flight each day. These passengers will presumably be barred
from flying unless they are able to challenge and correct any erroneous
information that may have led to their risk assessment.
8 4
The August 1 Notice spoke to many of the issues concerning the CAPPS
II System that the previous Notice failed to address. The August 1 Notice did
not, however, explain any redress procedures that will be available to
passengers who are delayed or detained because of an erroneous assessment.
The Notice did provide for a passenger advocate to deal with passengers'
complaints about the information obtained from their records.8 5 The only
records the passengers will be able to access, however, are those "containing
information [the passengers] provided"--essentially their name, address, phone
number, and birth date.8 6 The databases that the System accesses and the
criteria it uses to conduct the risk assessments will remain confidential.
8 7
Because data from the commercial and government databases will not be
available for review, passengers' efforts to contest their records will be
relatively useless.88
82. Id.
83. See Goo, supra note 26, at AI (stating that approximately one to two percent of
passengers will be assessed as a high risk to aviation security).
84. Officials will prohibit passengers from boarding a commercial aircraft if the CAPPS II
System determines that the passengers are a high risk to aviation security. August I Notice, 68
Fed. Reg. at 45,266. Thus, until the passengers are able to correct the erroneous information
that led to their risk assessment, they will continue to be tagged as a risk to aviation security.
85. See August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,269 (explaining that passenger complaints
about the system will be directed to a CAPPS 11 passenger advocate); see also Privacy Press
Release, supra note 59 ("When CAPPS II is implemented an independent ombudsmen will be
available to address concerns of individuals who believe they have been incorrectly singled-out
for additional screening.").
86. August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,269.
87. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 26 ("TSA officials stated that passengers will not
have access to any government data used to generate a passenger risk score due to national
security concerns. TSA officials have also not determined to what extent, if any, passengers will
be allowed to view information used by commercial data providers.").
88. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Legislative Update: The Five Problems with
CAPPS 11: Why Airline Passenger Profiling Proposal Should Be Abandoned, http://www.
aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID= 13356&c=206 (Aug. 25, 2003) [hereinafter
Legislative Update] (explaining that the TSA will limit the data available to the public) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 25-26
(identifying and discussing factors that could prevent the TSA from creating an adequate redress
process). In its February 2004 report, the GAO explained that "there are three concerns
regarding data in CAPPS II that may complicate the redress process." Id. at 25. The GAO's
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Responding to concerns that the CAPPS II System will infringe upon the
privacy and civil liberties of airline passengers, Congress amended the original
CAPPS I legislation in the Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization
Act.8 9 The amendment gave Congress oversight of the CAPPS II System and
mandated that the Secretary of Homeland Security, together with the Attorney
General, submit a written report addressing specific issues that Congress finds
troubling with the System.90 One of the questions Congress posited to the
Secretary was to explain how the System would "mitigate the effect of any errors,
and what procedural recourse will be available to passengers who believe the
System has wrongly barred them from taking flights."'" In February, 2004, the
United States General Accounting Office reported that the TSA had not
adequately addressed the above question and six others listed in the Vision 100--
Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act.
92
-In response to the February 2004 report and mounting pressure from privacy
advocates, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), in July, 2004,
the TSA's acting administrator announced that the TSA was "'reshaping and
repackaging' the screening system. 9 3 Although the Secretary of Homeland
Security, Tom Ridge, stated that the CAPPS I System could be considered
dead,94 the TSA's acting administrator explained that the program had not been
first concern is with the TSA's plans to remove information gathered through a passenger's risk
assessment from the computer system soon after the completion of the passenger's flight. Id. at
26. This raises concerns about the ability of passengers to challenge their assessment if the
information has already been deleted. Id. The second concern raised in the report is that the
public will not have access to many of the records used in the risk assessment, making it
extremely difficult for passengers to adequately challenge an erroneous assessment. Id. Finally,
the GAO Report acknowledges concerns about correcting erroneous data. Id. The TSA has
stated that the passengers will be responsible for contacting commercial database sources to
correct mistakes in the data, which may not be possible if the database licensing agreement
prevents the government from releasing the names of the databases to the passengers. Id. The
GAO concluded that the TSA needed to resolve these, and other policy issues, before the
implementation of CAPPS II. Id. at 25.
89. Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, 117
Stat. 2490 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); see Roy Mark,
Senate Wants Oversight of CAPPS !1 System, at http://dc.intemet.cor/news/article.php
/2110391 (Mar. 17, 2003) (quoting Sen. Wyden, who proposed the amendment giving Congress
oversight of CAPPS I, stating that "[i]t's a matter of good public policy for the privacy and
civil liberties implications of [CAPPS II] to be reported to Congress") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
90. Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act § 608, 117 Stat. at 2569-70.
91. Id. at 2570.
92. GAO REPoRT, supra note 43, at 13.
93. Leslie Miller, New passenger screening plan not ready tofly, Cm. SuN-TnmEs, July
14, 2004, at 46, 2004 WL 63149361.
94. See Cynthia L. Webb, Uncle Sam Mothballs Screening Program, at
1400
RED FLAGGING DUE PROCESS
eliminated, but that the agency was considering making changes to four
components of the CAPPS II System: "an identity verification process; a check
of each passenger's name against government lists of known terrorists; a
process by which each passenger would be assessed and assigned a numerical
score to rate the risk the traveler posed to the aircraft; and a comparison of each
passenger's name against databases of known violent criminals."95 In August,
2004, the TSA announced that the redesigned CAPPS II System, renamed
Secure Flight, will continue to use a two-step process to verify passengers'
identities and conduct risk assessments for possible terrorists.96 The new
System will not, however, use algorithms in the verification process and will no
longer scan for wanted violent criminals.97 Although the changes expected in
the new System address the privacy concerns raised by civil liberties advocates,
these changes do not address concerns that the System infringes upon the
procedural due process rights of airline passengers detained by the System.
III. Roth and Perry: The Constitutional Framework for Determining
When Process Is Due
As discussed in Part II, supra, the CAPPS II regulations provide few, if
any, procedural due process safeguards to passengers who are identified as a
high risk to aviation security and assigned a red color code, and the government
has given no indication that any changes under the redesigned CAPPS II
System will result in additional safeguards. Procedural due process is "our
fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protection against arbitrary, capricious,
and unreasonable government action"98 and is triggered when the government
deprives a citizen of life, liberty, or property." Courts have generally
http://washingtonpost.com/ac2wp-dyn/A54487-2004Jul I 6?language=printer (July 16, 2004)
(stating that when Tom Ridge was asked at a press conference "'whether the [CAPPS II
Program] could be considered dead,' [he] jokingly gestured as if he were driving a stake through
his heart and said 'Yes'") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
95. See Sara Kehaulani Goo, TSA May Change Screening, WASH. POST, July 14,2004, at
El 0 (summarizing the acting administrator's statement to Congress about the changes that the
TSA is considering for the CAPPS If System).
96. See O'Harrow, Jr., supra note 35, at E3 (explaining the changes expected under the
redesigned CAPPS II System).
97. Id.
98. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,589 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,558 (1974) ("The touchstone of due process is protection of
the individual against arbitrary action of government." (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114,123 (1889))).
99. U.S. CoNT. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
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interpreted due process as including notice and an opportunity to be heard.'0°
Although procedural due process does not protect citizens from the deprivation
of their interests, it is meant to protect them from the erroneous deprivation of
those interests.'0 ' Courts will afford procedural due process protections
regardless of whether the interests to be protected are "rights" or "privileges."
0 2
To require the government to provide procedural due process safeguards
to red-coded passengers, the passengers must possess an identifiable interest in
life, liberty, or property, and the government's action must infringe upon that
interest.' ° In Board of Regents v. Roth"°4 and its companion case, Perry v.
Sindermann,0 5 the Supreme Court set forth a two-step process for determining
without due process of law."). Because CAPPS Ii is a federal program, the Fifth Amendment is
applicable when conducting a due process analysis of the System.
100. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,348-49 (1976) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
101. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).
102. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-72 (rejecting the distinction between rights and privileges).
103. See, e.g., id. at 569 ("The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and
property."); see also Christine N. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era ofDevolution, 9 GEo.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 89, 89 (2002) (explaining that the courts search for a constitutionally
protected interest when deciding procedural due process cases).
104. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The respondent in Roth, an assistant
professor at a state university, sued the University alleging that the decision not to renew his
teaching contract was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and that the failure of the
University to provide him with an opportunity to be heard violated his right to due process. Id.
at 568-69. In order to determine whether a hearing was required, the Court looked to whether
the respondent had a liberty or property interest in his employment at the University. Id. at
571-78. The Court found that the respondent was not deprived of liberty when the University
refused to renew his job contract because the school did nothing to injure the respondent's
reputation or to prevent him from acquiring another job at other public universities. Id. at 573.
In assessing whether the respondent was denied a property interest, the Court explained that the
"procedural protection of property is a safeguard of security of interests that a person has
already acquired in specific benefits." Id. at 576. In order for the interest to be protected, a
person must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the property. Id. at 577. Because the
respondent's contract with the University was for a term of only one year and because there was
no statute that granted the respondent entitlement to re-employment at the University, the Court
found that the respondent did not have a property interest in being rehired by the University. Id.
at 578. The Court therefore held that the University was not required to offer the respondent a
hearing prior to or after his termination. Id. at 578-79.
105. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In Perry, the respondent was an employee
of a state college for four consecutive years. Id. at 594. His initial one-year contract was
renewed each of the consecutive three years for a one-year term. Id. During his last year of
employment at the college, the Board of Regents voted not to renew his contract and issued a
press release stating reasons for this decision. Id. at 595. The Board did not, however, provide
the respondent with a statement of reasons for the decision not to renew his contract, nor did the
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whether a property or liberty interest is at stake. 106 The court must first identify
whether a liberty or property interest has been implicated by state action.1
0 7
The Roth Court explained that when identifying this interest, "[courts] must
look not to the 'weight' [of the interest involved] but to the nature of the
interest at stake."'0 8 If the court finds that the nature of an interest gives rise to
a liberty or property interest, then the court reaches the second prong of the
analysis and assesses the adequacy of the procedural measures provided.' °9
A. Locating an Identifiable Interest in Liberty and Property
1. Liberty Interests
The redesigned CAPPS II System may infringe upon passengers' interests
if those passengers have an identifiable liberty interest at stake." 0 Courts
define liberty interests, relying on constitutional interpretation to determine the
existence of such interests.' These interests are construed broadly and include
the freedom to contract, to obtain knowledge, to marry, and to have children."
2
In determining whether there was a liberty interest at stake, the Court, in both
Roth and Perry, declined to define specifically the scope of liberty interests.
The Roth Court noted, however, that "'[w]ithout doubt, [the interest] denotes
Board provide the respondent with an opportunity to be heard on the matter. Id. In determining
whether the Board violated the respondent's procedural due process rights, the Court assessed
the respondent's allegations that the interest in his employment was secured by an
understanding that his long period of service guaranteed him some type of tenure at the college.
Id. at 600-01. Finding that the respondent may be able to show that his reliance on the
college's policies on tenure provided him with a legitimate claim of entitlement to the job, the
Court remanded the case stating that if the respondent could prove his property interest, the
college officials would be obligated to provide the respondent with a hearing. Id. at 603-04.
106. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71.
107. Id.; see also William P. Quigley, Due Process Rights of Grade School Students
Subjected to High-Stakes Testing, 10 B.U. Pun. INT. L.J. 284,290 (Spring 2001) (explaining the
two-step process used in deciding procedural due process actions).
108. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571.
109. See id. at 569-70 (stating that before the Court can balance the interests of the parties
involved, the Court must identify a liberty or property interest).
110. See id. at 569 (determining that due process is triggered when there is an identifiable
liberty or property interest at stake).
11. See Joshua D. Zelma, Note, Recent Developments in International Law: Anti-
Terrorism Legislation-Part Two. The Impact and Consequences, I J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 421,428 (2002) (explaining that liberty interests are determined based on constitutional
interpretation).
112. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
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not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the
individual.., generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized... as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."' 3 Therefore,
courts will find that a liberty interest has been implicated even when the




The redesigned CAPPS II System may also infringe upon the
passengers' property interests if they have an identifiable property interest
at stake." 5  Unlike liberty interests, property interests are not defined
through constitutional interpretation." 6  Instead, they are created and
defined by "rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source... that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those benefits."" 7 The Roth Court explained that when a
person has more than an "abstract need or desire for" the property interest
being protected, procedural due process safeguards are implicated." 8 To
have an identifiable property interest, a person must have a "legitimate
claim of entitlement" to the property. 19 To determine whether a person has
a legitimate claim of entitlement, courts must look to outside sources, such
as state and federal laws, regulations, customs, and well-settled practices.
20
113. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
114. Id.; see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,168(195 1)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("This Court is not alone in recognizing that the right to be heard
before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the
stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.").
115. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569 (determining that due process is triggered when there is an




119. Id.; see also Emilio .Jaksetic, Security Clearance Determinations and Due Process, 12
GEO. MASON L. REv. 171, 180 (1990) (stating that a "person must have a benefit, privilege,
status, or position under applicable law that cannot be removed or taken away by the
government except 'for cause'").
120. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (explaining that property interests are not defined by the
Constitution, but rather come from an independent source).
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B. Roth and Perry Meet Mathews: Determining What Process Is Due
Although locating an identifiable liberty and property interest satisfies the
first prong of the Roth/Perry framework, "[o]nce it is determined that due
process applies, the question remains what process is due.'0 21 If the redesigned
CAPPS II System implicates either a liberty or a property interest, the second
step of the framework requires the court to assess what minimum procedures
must be provided and whether currently provided safeguards are adequate.
122
Although the minimum procedures required "var[y] directly with the
importance of the private interest affected and the need for and usefulness of
the particular safeguard in the given circumstances and inversely with the
burden and any other adverse consequences of affording it,'" 23 the Court
frequently has held that some kind of hearing is necessary when deprivation of
either a liberty or property is at stake.'
2 4
To ascertain what minimum procedures are due, the Supreme Court, in
Mathews v. Eldridge,21 identified three separate factors that courts must weigh
and balance: (1) the private interest; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation under
the current procedures used, "and the probable value, if any, of additional or
121. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see also Edward L. Rubin, Due
Process and the A dministrative State, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1044, 1136 (1984) (explaining that if due
process is triggered, the courts must then determine what type of process is due).
122. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (describing the second prong of the
Roth/Perry framework).
123. Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1278 (1975).
124. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (determining that a
hearing is required when either property or liberty interests are implicated); Bd. of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972) ("When protected interests are implicated, the right to some
kind of hearing is paramount."); see also Friendly, supra note 123, at 1267 (stating that the
Court has held that due process requires a hearing prior to deprivation of property or liberty).
125. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319(1976). In Mathews, the Court concluded that a
beneficiary of social security disability benefits was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior
to the deprivation of those benefits. Id. at 349. After terminating Eldridge's disability benefits,
the Social Security Administration notified him that his benefits would be terminated, but that
he could seek reconsideration of the decision. Id. at 324. Eldridge argued that his benefits
should not be terminated until after he had an opportunity for a hearing on whether he remained
disabled and thus eligible for the benefits. Id. at 325. The Court reasoned that because Eldridge
would be entitled to retroactive benefits if the agency reversed the termination decision,
Eldridge's only interest was uninterrupted receipt of the benefits pending final determination of
his claim. Id. at 340. The Court also found that the pretermination procedures employed by the
agency adequately safeguarded Eldridge's interest in his benefits. Id. at 343-47. The Court
further explained that the financial and administrative burdens on the government would be
substantial if a pretermination hearing was required. Id. at 347. The Court therefore concluded
that the current procedures satisfied due process requirements and that due process did not
mandate a pretermination hearing. Id. at 349.
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substitute procedural safeguards;" and (3) the governmental interest, including
how additional or substitute procedures would burden the government. 126 The
Mathews Court explained that balancing these three interests is necessary in
each case because due process requirements vary depending on the
circumstances of each situation.12 As such, a court's analysis for the second
step of the framework must consider each of the three factors individually
within the context of the particular case.
IV. Identifying Airline Passengers 'Interests: Application of
Roth and Perry
Before conducting the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to evaluate
what process is due, this Note must ascertain whether the first prong of the
Roth/Perry framework is satisfied. In order to meet the demands of the first
prong, airline passengers must have an identifiable liberty or property interest
(or both) upon which the state infringes. This Part will apply the Roth/Perry
framework to evaluate: (1) whether passengers have a liberty interest in their
right to travel by air both within the United States and internationally, and
whether the redesigned CAPPS II System infringes upon passengers' liberty
interest; and (2) whether passengers have an identifiable property interest, and
if so, whether the government infringes upon that right by prohibiting red-
coded passengers from boarding their scheduled flight.
A. Recognition of Passengers' Liberty Interest in the Right to Airline Travel
The federal courts have long recognized that United States citizens enjoy a
right to travel. 28 The Supreme Court has concluded that although citizens have
126. Id. at 335.
127. Id. at 334. In discussing the importance of weighing the public and private interests,
the Mathews Court cited two cases that described due process as a flexible legal concept. In
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (196 1), the Court wrote that "'due process,' unlike
some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances." Id. at 895 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 162-63 (1951). in addition, in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court noted
that due process "calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Id.
at 481.
128. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,630 (1969) (recognizing that the right
to travel is a fundamental right); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (recognizing that the
right to travel is a liberty interest of which persons cannot be deprived without the due process
of law); see also Reser, supra note 22, at 832 ("There exists in the United States a citizen's
constitutional right to travel. This right may only be limited in certain circumstances.").
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a fundamental right to engage in interstate travel within the United States, 29
citizens have only a freedom to travel internationally. 130  This difference
equates only to a varying level of scrutiny in assessing the constitutionality of
restrictions on the right to travel within the United States 13 and the freedom to
travel abroad. 32 Regardless of whether the travel being restricted is within the
United States or abroad, "[t]he right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which
the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law.'
' 33
1. The Right to Interstate Travel: A Fundamental Liberty Interest
For almost two hundred years, the federal courts have acknowledged that
the right to travel freely among the states is a fundamental right under the
Constitution. 34 In United States v. Guest, 31 for example, the Supreme Court
129. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631 (finding that there exists a fundamental right to
travel within the United States).
130. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,306 (1981) (emphasizing that "the freedom to travel
outside the United States must be distinguished from the right to travel within the United
States").
131. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999) (applying strict scrutiny analysis
when determining the constitutionality of a statute restricting interstate travel); Shapiro, 94 U.S.
at 634 (adopting an equal protection analysis and applying strict scrutiny to actions that
infringed upon a person's right to travel); see also Katherine Warner, Comment, You Can't Get
Therefrom Here: Travel Restrictions and the Airlines, 58 J. AIR L. & CoM. 345, 352 (1992)
("[lihe interstate right to travel will be carefully protected, and intrusions into this right will be
carefully scrutinized by the courts.").
132. See, e.g., Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1978) (explaining that
infringements on international travel will not be subject to as close scrutiny as intrusions on the
right to interstate travel); see also Reser, supra note 22, at 836 (concluding that the freedom to
travel internationally will only be limited when national security or foreign policy so mandate).
133. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
134. See Gregory B. Hartch, Wrong Turns: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Right to
Travel Cases, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 457, 459 (1995) (explaining that a court first discussed
the right to travel in Corfield v. Coryell, which was decided in 1823). In Corfield v. Coryell, 6
F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230), the court identified "the right of a citizen of one
state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture and
professional pursuits" as a fundamental privilege. Id. at 552.
135. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). In Guest, the Supreme Court considered
whether the district court erred in dismissing indictments charging the six defendants with
conspiring to deprive black citizens in Athens, Georgia, of several constitutional and legal
rights. Id. at 746-48. The Court reversed the judgment of the district court on all but one of the
charges, including a charge that the defendants deprived the black citizens of their right to travel
freely. Id. at 749. The Court explained that because the right to travel is a fundamental right
recognized under the Constitution, the charge was based on a law of the United States. Id. at
757-60. The Court noted that in order for the defendants to be convicted on this count, at trial
the prosecution would have to prove that the defendants acted with specific intent to deprive the
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explained, "The constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and
necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate
commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our
Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly
recognized.' ' 136 Although the Constitution does not specifically enumerate a
right to interstate travel, the Supreme Court has suggested that the freedom to
travel is such a basic right that it was implicit in the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. 3 7 At times, the Court has attempted to place the right within a
particular textual source, 38 while at other times the Justices have considered
the task of locating the right within a specific constitutional provision to be
unnecessary, instead interpreting the right to travel as fundamental to the
Union. 3 9
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the idea that the
freedom to travel throughout the nation is a fundamental right under the
Constitution. 40 In Shapiro v. Thompson,' 4' for example, the Court concluded
victims of their right to travel. Id. at 760.
136. Id. at 757.
137. See, e.g., id. at 758 (explaining that there is no explicit reference to the right to travel
from state to state in the Constitution because "a right so elementary was conceived from the
beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created"); see
also ZECHARIAH CHAEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTrrUtoN, 184-87 (1956)
(proposing that, although the Constitution does not include the phrase from the Articles of
Confederation granting citizens free movement to and from states, the Framers of the
Constitution intended to include the right but believed that the right to travel was imbedded
somewhere else in the Constitution).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 314 U.S. 160, 172-74 (1941) (stating that the
right to travel is protected by the Commerce Clause); id. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the right to travel is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause); id. at 182 (Jackson, J., concurring) (same).
139. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe
frequent attempts to assign the right to travel some textual source in the Constitution seem... to
have proved both inconclusive and unnecessary."); Guest, 383 U.S. at 757-59 (1966)
(explaining that even though the Court has identified various textual sources for the right to
travel, it is not necessary to determine the correct source because the Court has consistently held
that the right exists); see also Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1868) (finding that
the right to travel was implied in the Constitution because "[w]e are all citizens of the United
States, and as members of the same community we must have the right to pass and repass
through every part of it without interruption"); Hartch, supra note 134, at 459 (noting that "the
Court has struggled to identify a doctrinal justification for the right [to travel]").
140. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,630-31 (1969) (stating that the Court had
"no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional
provision" and explaining that it is sufficient that the freedom to travel is a fundamental and
long recognized constitutional right).
141. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro, the Supreme Court
considered whether statutory provisions in two states and the District of Columbia (District) that
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that the right to travel was a constitutional right, and any classification that
infringes upon that right will be subject to strict scrutiny analysis, 42 whereby
"any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional." 143  The Court has continued to require a compelling
government interest in cases in which the government has infringed upon the
right to interstate travel,'44 thus maling it clear that the Court will apply strict
scrutiny analysis to any law or regulation that infringes upon this fundamental
right.
Although the foregoing discussion clearly establishes that there is a
fundamental right to interstate travel, assessing whether red-coded passengers
denied welfare benefits to new residents were constitutionally permissible. Id. at 622. Each of
the challenged statutes disallowed residents from receiving welfare benefits until they had
resided in the state or District for one year. Id. The states and the District argued that the
restrictions were justified because they served as protective mechanisms by which the financial
solvency of their respective programs would be preserved. Id. at 627-28. The Court stated that,
while requiring a one-year residency requirement prior to the distribution of welfare benefits
may in fact have acted as a protective mechanism, such purpose was unconstitutional. Id. at
629. The Court reasoned that the statutes were an unconstitutional infringement on the
plaintiffs' right to travel. Id. at 629-30. Because the states failed to provide the Court with a
compelling government interest which would override the plaintiffs' fundamental right to travel
freely from state to state, the Court found the statutes unconstitutional. Id. at 638.
142. See id. at 634 (adopting an equal protection analysis and applying strict scrutiny to
actions that infringed upon a person's right to travel); see also Hartch, supra note 134, at 472
(stating that the Shapiro Court identified the right to travel as a fundamental right and applied
strict scrutiny review).
143. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.
144. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 (1999) (finding a statute that limited the
maximum welfare benefits available to new residents unconstitutional because the state was
unable to provide a compelling interest that would justify an intrusion on the right to travel);
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. Z50, 269 (1974) (invalidating a state statute that
imposed a durational residence requirement on one's ability to obtain state-provided free
medical care because the statute was not substantiated by a compelling governmental interest);
cf Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,408-09 (1975) (finding that Iowa had sufficiently compelling
state interests in requiring one year of residency in order for the State to grant a divorce decree).
In Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), the Court clarified that the right to travel actually
encompasses three separate interests: (1) the right to move freely from one state to another;
(2) the right to be accepted as a friendly visitor to the state; and (3) the right to be treated the
same as citizens of the state. Id. at 500. The Court specifically identified the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV as the source of the second component and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause as the source of the third component of the
right to travel. Id. at 501-03. With regard to the first component, the right to move freely from
state to state, the Court declined to pinpoint a particular constitutional source granting that right
and instead stated that this right "may simply have been 'conceived from the beginning to be a
necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created."' Id. at 501 (quoting
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)).
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have a fundamental liberty interest upon which the government has infringed
requires a determination of whether the right to interstate travel includes an
entitlement to interstate airline travel. Even though a number of courts have
held that burdens placed on a single mode of transportation do not implicate the
right to travel,' 45 several courts addressing minor restrictions on air travel have
acknowledged that major restrictions, such as banning passengers from flying
to a particular airport, "might well give rise to a constitutional claim."'146 These
cases support the argument that even though there is no fundamental right to
the most convenient form of travel, a restriction that completely bans
passengers from traveling by air may be such a major burden that it
unconstitutionally burdens the passengers' fundamental right to interstate
travel. 47  Thus, because the government will completely bar red-coded
passengers from traveling by air, it is possible that even'the redesigned CAPPS
II System unconstitutionally infringes upon these passengers' fundamentally
protected liberty interests.1
48
145. See, e.g., City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting
that there is no "constitutional right to the most convenient form of travel"); Monarch Travel
Servs., Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1972) (explaining that
limiting the choice of mode of transportation is not unconstitutional).
146. See City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1192 (asserting that a ban on airline travelers from
flying into Houston's National Airport could implicate the right the travel). In City of
Houston, the court considered the constitutionality of a DOT regulation that prohibited
flights originating more than 1000 miles from Washington, D.C., from flying directly into
National Airport. Id. at 1187. The court noted that the "perimeter rule" did not completely
ban persons from flying into National Airport; rather, it only required that in order to travel
to National Airport, passengers' flights from outside of the one-thousand mile perimeter must
make a stop somewhere within one-thousand miles of Washington, D.C. Id. at 1192.
In another case addressing limited operations at a particular airport, Kansas v. United
States, 797 F. Supp. 1042 (D.D.C. 1992), the court found that the challenged statute was not
an unconstitutional infringement on the right to travel because it did not prohibit airline
passengers from engaging in interstate travel because an alternate airport was available. Id.
at 1052. The court noted, however, that it would reach a different result if the airport in
question was the only airport within the state. According to the court, "a congressional
enactment that limited the flights from that airport to certain states would clearly implicate
the right to interstate travel." Id. at 1052 n.20.
147. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text (discussing the implication of the
right to travel). See generally William Mann, Comment, All the (Air) Rage: Legal
Implications Surrounding Airline and Government Bans on Unruly Passengers in the Sky, 65
J. AIR L. & COM. 857, 866-70 (2000) (arguing that a ban on air travel could implicate the
right to travel).
148. If a ban on airline travel implicates the fundamental right to interstate travel, it may
give rise to a substantive due process claim and thus subject the CAPPS I1 System to strict
scrutiny analysis. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (noting that
"the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"' (quoting Moore v. City of
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Even if the redesigned CAPPS II System does not violate red-coded
passengers' fundamental right to interstate airline travel, it does trigger
procedural due process because the passengers certainly have a liberty interest
in travel that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects. This
argument is made by drawing a comparison to cases that have considered
whether citizens have a constitutional right to operate a motor vehicle.
Although these cases have held that there is no constitutional right to operate a
motor vehicle, the courts explained that when licenses are taken away by state
action, they "are not to be taken away without that procedural due process
required by the Fourteenth Amendment."149 Thus, even though citizens do not
have a fundamental right to drive a car, the courts recognize that they have a
liberty interest in maintaining their ability to do so.' ° Similarly, even if
passengers do not have a fundamental liberty interest in the right to interstate
airline travel, the courts will recognize that passengers maintain an interest in
traveling by air that is sufficient to trigger due process if the government
prohibits them from flying interstate."'
2. The Freedom to Travel Internationally: A Recognized Liberty Interest
The Supreme Court has explained that although there are few, if any,
permissible limitations on the right to travel from state to state, "the 'right' of
international travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect of the
'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
52
Although the Court has applied strict scrutiny to any restrictions placed on the
right to interstate travel, the Court has not offered this same protection to the
freedom to travel abroad.153 However, even though the Court does not consider
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion))). The constitutionality of the
CAPPS I1 System and an inquiry into whether the System violates substantive due process are,
however, outside of the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note identifies the right to travel as a
liberty interest and focuses on whether the government provides sufficient procedural due
process safeguards to protect red-coded passengers from erroneous deprivation of that liberty
interest.
149. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539(1971);see also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105,112
(1977) ("It is clear that the Due Process Clause applies to the deprivation of a driver's license by
the State.").
150. Bell, 402 U.S. at 539 ("Once licenses are issued... their continued possession may
become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.").
15 1. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (stating that the courts must
look to the nature of the interest, not the weight of the interest).
152. Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176 (1978) (citations omitted).
153. See id. at 176-77 (explaining that infringements on international travel will not be as
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the right to foreign travel to be on the same constitutional footing as the right to
interstate travel, because the Court has recognized the right to international
travel as a liberty interest, any infringement on that right will trigger procedural
due process safeguards.1 4 Although the Court has struggled to enunciate
clearly what rights Americans have to travel abroad during the last half
century,' S5 the Court has repeatedly stated that Americans have a liberty interest
in the right to travel abroad "of which [they] cannot be deprived without the
due process of law under the Fifth Amendment." s
6
The first line of Supreme Court cases to consider the right to travel abroad
addressed the constitutionality of restrictions on who may travel abroad.
s 7
These cases determined when the Secretary of State or Congress may refuse to
issue passports to American citizens.15 8 In assessing these restrictions, the
Court reiterated that Americans have a liberty interest in the right to travel and
any restrictions must conform to the mandates of the Due Process Clause.'19 As
such, the Court concluded that any laws or regulations that place restrictions on
closely scrutinized as intrusions on the right to interstate travel); see also Reser, supra note 22,
at 836 (suggesting that there are fewer limitations on the right to interstate travel than there are
on the right to travel internationally); Warner, supra note 13 1, at 352 (explaining that the right
to travel internationally has not been "as clearly or unqualifiedly stated" as the right to interstate
travel).
154. See Califano, 439 U.S. at 176 (emphasizing that international travel "can be regulated
in the bounds of due process" (citations omitted)); Roth, 408 U.S. at 569 (stating that the
infringement of a liberty interest implicates procedural due process); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 599 (1972) (explaining that an opportunity to be heard is required when the
government has infringed upon a liberty interest).
155. Compare Kentv. Dulles,357U.S. 116, 129-30(1958)(findingthattheSecretaryof
State did not have the statutory authority to deny passports on ideological grounds) with Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309-10 (1981) (explaining that the President may take actions to restrict
foreign travel when there is a substantial likelihood that the travel will jeopardize national
security).
156. Kent, 357 U.S. at 125.
157. See Aptheker v. Sec. of State, 378 U.S. 500,514(1964) (concluding that a statute that
prohibited members of a registered Communist organization to hold or use passports was an
unconstitutional infringement on the appellants' right to travel); Kent, 357 U.S. at 130 (finding
that the Secretary of State lacked statutory authority to deny passports to applicants wishing to
travel abroad solely because of the applicants' ideological beliefs).
158. See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 505 (determining that a congressional statute that prohibited
members of a registered Communist organization to hold or use passports too broadly restricted
the liberty interests of the applicants and was therefore unconstitutional); Kent, 357 U.S. at 130
(concluding that the Secretary of State lacked the statutory authority to deny passports solely
because of the applicants' ideological beliefs).
159. Kent, 357 U.S. at 125.
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who may travel abroad must be narrowly construed' 6° and cannot abridge the
citizens' liberty interest in their right to travel abroad.
16 1
In addition to the cases that address whether restrictions placed onwho
may travel are constitutional, the Court also has considered cases involving
restrictions on where one may travel abroad. 62 In Zemel v. Rusk,163 the Court
considered the constitutionality of the Secretary of State's refusal to validate the
passports of United States citizens who planned to travel to Cuba.'64 On appeal
of the district court's dismissal of the case, the Supreme Court distinguished
this case from those involving restrictions on who may travel, stating that the
government did not impose the area restriction in this case because of a
person's membership in a certain political organization, but rather because of
the foreign policy concerns of the nation. 6 The Court concluded that although
the right to travel is a liberty interest that cannot be impeded without due
process, "the fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process of law
does not mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited.,'6
160. See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 505 (explaining that a statute that prohibited members of a
registered Communist organization to hold or use passports was unconstitutional because it "too
broadly and indiscriminately restricts the right to travel and thereby abridges the liberty
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment"); Kent, 357 U.S. at 129 (noting that when the right to
travel or other similar activities are involved, any "delegated powers that curtail or dilute them"
must be narrowly construed).
161. See Kent, 357 U.S. at 130 (stating that the Secretary of State did not have the authority
to curtail the applicants' liberty interests based on their suspected involvement in the
Communist Party).
162. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965) (determining that the Secretary of
State was justified in concluding "that travel to Cuba by American citizens might involve the
Nation in dangerous international incidents, and that the Constitution does not require him to
validate passports for such travel"); see also United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481-87
(1967) (addressing whether the statute requiring a passport for entry into or departure from the
United States authorized criminal sanctions for travel to or from Cuba without a valid passport).
163. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 15.
164. Id. at 3. In 1961, the United States broke off all diplomatic ties with Cuba and
declared that passports would no longer be validated for travel to Cuba except with the
permission of the Secretary of State. Id. The State Department issued a press release along with
the regulation stating that it may allow persons covering news or those having previously
established business interests in Cuba to continue traveling to Cuba. Id. The appellant sought
to have his passport validated for travel to Cuba. Id. The Secretary of State, however, denied
his request "on the ground that the purpose of the trip did not meet the previously prescribed
standards for such travel." Id. at 4.
165. Id. at 13 ("In this case, however, the Secretary has refused to validate appellant's
passport not because of any characteristic peculiar to appellant, but rather because of foreign
policy considerations affecting all citizens.").
166. Id. at 14.
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In 1981, the Supreme Court decided Haig v. Agee,1 67 a case that does not
clearly fall into either of the two lines of right to international travel cases
previously discussed. In Agee, the Court clearly distinguished the freedom to
travel abroad from the right to interstate travel, stating that "the freedom to
travel abroad.., is subject to reasonable government regulations." 16  The
Court determined that the government may impose reasonable regulations
"when there is a substantial likelihood of 'serious damage' to national security
or foreign policy as a result of the passport holder's activities in foreign
countries." 169
Even though the Agee decision represented a departure from previous
international right to travel cases that had protected the right of citizens to travel
abroad, the Agee Court continued to recognize the freedom to travel abroad as a
liberty interest, and stated that any regulations of that interest must be "within
the bounds of due process."' 170 As such, even if this right can be inhibited
because of concerns for national security, citizens are entitled to procedural due
process safeguards when the government places restrictions on their freedom to
travel outside the United States.17 1 A complete ban on foreign air travel would
constitute a direct and severe restriction on passengers' ability to travel abroad.
Because air travel is the only way that most United States citizens can travel to
countries overseas, a prohibition against airline travel would effectively serve as
a prohibition against international travel. Therefore, passengers certainly have
167. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). Agee concerned the Secretary of State's
revocation of a passport based on the proposed activities of the passport holder while abroad.
Id. at 282. Philip Agee, an American citizen residing abroad, was employed by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) for nine years. Id. at 283. Several years after the termination of his
employment with the CIA, Agee announced that he was embarking on a campaign to expose the
officers and agents of the CIA in an effort to fight against the CIA's operations. Id. Because he
exposed the identities of several CIA agents, the Secretary of State revoked Agee's passport
based on a State Department regulation that authorized revocation of passports when the
holder's activities abroad lead to the damage of, or are likely to harm, our national security. Id.
at 286. Agee filed suit, and the district court and a divided court of appeals held that the
Secretary's action exceeded his statutory authority. Id. 287-88. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed the district court, instead finding that Congress had implicitly authorized the Secretary
to revoke passports on the ground that the holder represents a threat to the security of the nation.
Id. at 306. The Court concluded that Agee's activities posed a threat not only to national
security but also to the nation's relationships with other countries, and that such a restriction on
Agee's foreign travel was the only means available to the government to prevent further damage
to our national security and foreign relations. Id. 308.
168. Id. at 306.
169. Id. at 309.
170. Id. at 307 (quoting Califano v. Tones, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1978)).
171. Id. at 306; see also Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176(1978) (stating that the
freedom to travel abroad may be "regulated in the bounds of due process").
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a liberty interest in their right to travel by air to destinations outside the United
States, and they should be entitled to procedural due process protections before
an exacting restriction banning foreign air travel, such as CAPPS II or Secure
Flight would institute, is placed on their liberty interest.
3. Implication of the Liberty Interest in the Right to Travel
Under the Roth/Perry framework, the government must infringe upon an
identifiable liberty interest in a right to airline travel in order to trigger
procedural due process.172 The Court, in Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil
Service Commission,173 explained that a law or regulation "implicates the right
to travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its primary
objective, or when it uses 'any classification which serves to penalize the
exercise of that right." 74 Under the Soto-Lopez framework, the redesigned
CAPPS II System implicates the right to airline travel in two ways. First, the
TSA developed CAPPS II with the express objective of impeding travel for
red-coded passengers. 75 The System screens all airline passengers in an effort
to prevent those persons who pose a threat to aviation security from boarding
commercial aircraft. 176 Clearly, the objective of the System is to prohibit, or at
least inhibit, red-coded passengers from traveling by air in the United States.
172. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,569-70(1972) ("When protected interests
are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.").
173. Soto-Lopez v. N.Y. City Civil Serv. Cornm'n, 476 U.S. 898 (1986). In Soto-Lopez,
two American citizens residing in New York, both of whom resided in Puerto Rico at the time
of their enrollment in the United States Army, sued the Civil Service Commission after the
Commission denied their bonus points for armed forces service when they applied for
employment with the Commission. Id. at 900-01. The Commission disallowed the awarding of
the bonus points because they were not residents of New York when they entered the Army. Id.
at 901. The plaintiffs claimed that the denial of points violated both their equal protection rights
and their constitutional right to travel. Id. Finding that the provision penalized the plaintiffs for
traveling to New York, the court held that the provision violated the right to travel. id. at 909.
The Court also concluded that the provision awarding the bonus points based on residence in
the State of New York at the time of entry into service violated the equal protection rights of the
plaintiffs. Id. at 911.
174. Id. at 903 (citations omitted).
175. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, CAPPS 11 Fact Sheet, at
http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?theme=8&content--708 (Sept. 29, 2003) ("CAPPS Ii is
designed to ensure that terrorists and violent fugitives do not present a threat to aviation
security.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
176. See id. (explaining that the CAPPS I System is intended to prevent terrorists from
posing a threat to aviation security); August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,265, 45,266 (Aug. 1,
2003) (stating that CAPPS Il's intended purpose is to screen all airline passengers for possible
security risks).
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Second, the ban on air travel imposed upon red-coded passengers will prevent
them from obtaining their boarding passes and boarding their scheduled flight,
thus deterring passengers from exercising their right to travel. Even if the TSA
changes the manner in which passengers' identities are verified and the process
by which the passengers are assessed, the CAPPS II System, or Secure Flight,
will continue to implicate the right to airline travel under the Soto-Lopez
framework, as the government's clear objective with any screening system is to
impede the travel of passengers who represent a high risk to aviation security.
B. Recognition of Passengers' Property Interests
Roth and Perry established that in order for a person to have a property
interest in a right or privilege, he must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement
to it.' 77  As discussed supra, the Constitution does not create property
interests; "rather [property interests] are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source." 178  Therefore, to determine whether an airline passenger has a
legitimate claim of entitlement to a property interest, we must look to outside
sources, such as state law, contracts, or other rules.
179
Passengers have a claim of entitlement by virtue of their contractual
relationship with the airline. The Perry Court recognized that a claim of
entitlement could arise from a specific contractual provision if it would give
rise to a mutual understanding between the parties. 80 When passengers
purchase an airline ticket, the purchase creates a contract for transportation
between the passengers and the airline. 18' The ticket guarantees passengers a
right to an available seat on a particular flight.182 If the airline is unable to
177. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 601 (1972) ("A person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process
purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of
entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.").
178. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
179. Id.; see also D.J. GALLIGAN, DUE PROCESS AND FAIR PROCEDURES: A STUDY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 195 (1996) ("[W]hether or not there is an entitlement will ...
depend on the legislative framework under which the claim is made.").
180. Perry, 408 U.S. at 601.
•181. See Kelley v. Societe Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne, 242
F. Supp. 129, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (stating that an airline ticket constitutes a contract).
182. Air carriers guarantee reserved seats on a particular flight. See, e.g., DELTA AIR LINES,
INC., DELTA DOMESTIC GENERAL RULES TARIFF, Rule 245: Denied Boarding Compensation, 47,
http://www.delta.com/pdfs/contract-of carriagedom.pdf (last modified Oct. 25, 2004)
[hereinafter DELTA TAREFF] (explaining that a confirmed reserved ticket grants the passenger a
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provide the passengers with service on that particular flight, the airline will
provide the passengers with a refund, 183 rebook the passengers for another
flight, or provide alternate means of transportation. 8 4 Thus, when passengers
purchase airline tickets, there is a mutual understanding between the passengers
and the airline that the passengers are entitled to the seat that they purchased,
and that the airline has an obligation to transport the passengers, or to provide
the passengers with a refund, or to provide alternate means of travel. The
passengers therefore secure a legitimate claim of entitlement through the
contractual relationship with the airline and recognize a property interest in the
ticket and seat on a particular flight.
In addition to the property interest created by the passengers' contract with
the airlines, federal statutes arguably grant the passengers a property interest in
their ticket and airline seat. Passengers enjoy both a common law and statutory
right to travel by commercial airlines. 185 Congress has granted all citizens "a
public right of transit through ... navigable airspace."' 86 Although commercial
airlines have a duty to carry passengers who have paid for a ticket,187 Congress
mandates that the airlines refuse to transport a passenger who does not consent
right to a specific seat on a certain flight) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
see also Harby v. Saadeh, 816 F.2d 436,438 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that an open-return
ticket guarantees "merely the right to the next available open seat").
183. See, e.g., DELTA TARIFF, supra note 182, Rule 260: Involuntary Refunds, at 54
(guaranteeing a refund when a passenger is denied boarding for reasons such as flight
cancellation, failure to provide proof of identity, or government request or regulation); Id., Rule
270: Voluntary Refunds, at 55-56 (assuring that the airline will refund the ticket price if a
passenger is unable to board the plane for reasons other than those listed in Rule 260); US
AIRWAYS GROUP, INC. TERMS OF TRANSPORTATION, VIII. Refunds, http://www.usairways.com/
customers/travel_policies/terms/terms.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter US AIRWAYS
TERMS] (explaining terms of both voluntary and involuntary refunds) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
184. See, e.g., DELTA TARIFF, supra note 182, Rule 245: Denied Boarding Compensation,
at 49 (describing policies providing for transportation when the airlines are unable to carry a
passenger on the reserved flight); see also US AIRwAYS TERMS, supra note 183,1X Delayed and
Cancelled Flights (outlining the airline's policies for delayed or cancelled flights).
185. See Reser, supra note 22, at 839 ("Commercial airlines have a duty that arises from
both statutory as well as common law to provide service to all paying customers, as well as a
duty to protect the safety of their paying customers."); cf Ward v. Housatonic Area Reg'l
Transit Dist., 154 F. Supp. 2d 339 (D. Conn. 2001). In Ward, the plaintiff, after being
suspended from transit bus services, alleged that the defendant had deprived him of his property
interest in the bus service. Id. at 342. The court concluded that even though there was a state
statute that created the transit district, "no where [sic] does that statute or any other establish a
property interest for individuals in any such services." Id. at 348.
186. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2) (2000).
187. See Reser, supra note 22, at 839 (explaining that commercial airlines have a duty to
carry passengers who purchase a ticket).
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to a search of himself and his luggage.' The airlines also have discretion to
deny boarding to a passenger whom the airline perceives to be a safety threat. 89
Despite the ability of the airlines to restrict passengers based on safety
concerns, however, airlines maintain a duty to carry passengers who are not a
threat to safety.' 90 Because the airlines must transport paying passengers who
are not a security risk, the federal statute grants the passengers a property
interest in their ticket and seat. Regardless of whether erroneously red-coded
passengers have a statutory entitlement to their ticket and seat, they clearly have
a legitimate claim of entitlement based on their contractual relationship with the
airline-a claim that is infringed upon when the government labels them as a
high risk to security and prohibits them from boarding their flight.
V. The Due Process Challenge: Applying the Mathews Balancing Test
Having established that airline passengers have an identifiable liberty and
property interest in airline travel and that the government has given no
indication that it intends to alter any redress procedures provided under the
CAPPS II System when implementing Secure Flight, this Part explores whether
the redress procedures provided to red-coded passengers under the current
regulations are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.
If the current procedures are not sufficient, this Part asks what additional
process must be provided to the detained passengers under the redesigned
CAPPS II System, Secure Flight. Mathews v. Eldridge'9' provides a
framework for determining the adequacy of the procedures. The Mathews
Court developed a three-pronged test to determine whether the available
procedures meet the procedural due process safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.192 As discussed in Part III,
supra, this test balances the government's burden in providing "additional or
substitute procedural requirement[s]" against the importance of the passenger's
interests at stake, in light of the risk of erroneous deprivation attributable to the
188. 49 U.S.C. § 44902(a)(1) (2000).
189. 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2000).
190. See id. (stating that airlines may refuse to transport passengers who represent a threat
to safety).
191. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See supra note 125 for a discussion of
Mathews.
192. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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current procedures provided by the government and the probable value of any
additional safeguards.
193
A. The Interests of the Red-Coded Passengers
The first prong of the Mathews test is an assessment and analysis of the
private interests at stake. 94 Red-coded passengers have a significant interest in
avoiding erroneous deprivation of both their liberty interest in the right to travel
and their property interest in their airline ticket and seat. 195 Although airline
travel has continued to become more affordable during the last quarter-
century,196 passengers continue to spend a significant amount of money when
purchasing an airline ticket. Passengers, however, not only have a property
interest in the money they spent for the ticket,' 97 they also have a property
interest in their ticket and a seat on a particular flight by virtue of their
contractual relationship with the airline. 98 By depriving the passengers of the
right to use their purchased ticket, the government strips passengers of their
property interest in their ticket and seat along with the money the passengers
paid for the ticket. Even though airlines will provide a refund of the money
spent on a ticket to passengers who are denied boarding because of government
regulations,' 99 the government's action in red-coding the passengers deprives
the passengers' of their property interests in their ticket and the seat that their
ticket guarantees. 2°
The government deprives red-coded passengers not only of their property
interest in their purchased airline ticket, but also of their ability to move freely
throughout the United States and their ability to travel abroad. Although
passengers certainly are concerned with airline safety, especially in the wake of
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See supra Part IV (establishing passengers' liberty and property interests).
196. See World Tourism Statistics 2000-2002, at http://www.trentu.ca/anthropology
/anth409h/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 29,2004) ("Between 1978-1998, the real cost of air
travel fell by 35 percent .... A thousand miles of air travel now requires 61 hours less work
than it did a generation ago.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
197. See Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 443 (1901) (stating that
"[m]oney is certainly property").
198. See supra Part IV.B (determining that passengers have a property interest in their
airline ticket).
199. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (stating that airlines will provide refunds
to passengers who are denied boarding).
200. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (explaining that an airline ticket reserves a
particular seat on a certain flight).
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September 11, passengers also have an expectation of maintaining their right to
travel by air. The ability to travel freely throughout the United States and
abroad is an important and basic right of all citizens, 20 ' and, as such, passengers
have a great interest in safeguarding against the government's erroneous
deprivation of the passengers' interests in airline travel.
With almost two million passengers boarding commercial aircraft each day
in the United States,0 2 it is clear that Americans have become reliant on the
availability of air travel as an indispensable aspect of today's fast-paced society.
Thousands of business travelers rely on airline travel to attend meetings in
cities across the country and the world each day.203 If the redesigned CAPPS II
System erroneously codes passengers as a high risk to aviation security, the
passengers not only miss their scheduled flight, but, in all probability, will also
miss business meetings or other job-related events. In addition to the
detrimental effect a ban on airline travel would have on business travelers, such
a ban could also prevent passengers from attending weddings, funerals, or
family birthdays, therefore depriving them not only of their right to travel, but
also of the experience of these important "one-time" events. °4 Passengers
traveling for leisure who are banned from boarding their flight not only are
denied their ability to travel to their vacation, but also are deprived of their
vacation time.
The Supreme Court also has recognized the great social value in travel,
especially in traveling abroad,20 5 explaining that the freedom of movement
allows persons to obtain first-hand knowledge of public affairs, scientists and
scholars to discuss their work with colleagues, and students to supplement their
201. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126(1958) ("Freedom of movement is basic in our
scheme of values.").
202. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the number of daily airline
travelers).
203. See OFFICE OF TRAVEL & ToUIUSM INDUSTRIES, 2002 Profile of U.S. Resident
Travelers Visiting Overseas Destinations Reported From Survey oflnternationalAir Travelers,
http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/view/f-2002-101-001/index.html?ti cart cookie=20040229.213400.14
795 (posted July 2003) (listing the number of business travelers flying overseas in 2002 at
7,487,000 or thirty-two percent of all overseas travelers) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
204. This is especially true given that because red-coded passengers are not informed of
their risk assessment until they arrive at the airport to check-in for their scheduled flight, the
passengers will likely be unable to use an alternate mode of transportation to get to their
destination in time for the event. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text for a synopsis of
varying travel times for transportation by train or automobile.
205. Kent, 357 U.S. at 126-27; see also Allan D. Vestal, Freedom ofMovement, 41 IOWA
L. REv. 6, 14 (1955) ("[M]obility of the population is economically advantageous, is desired by
most persons, and is considered one of the generally accepted rights of individuals in a free
society.").
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education. °6 Prohibiting passengers from traveling by air would infringe upon
the social value of travel by almost completely preventing citizens from
obtaining first-hand knowledge of countries overseas. A ban on air travel
would also significantly inhibit the ability of Americans to obtain knowledge
about public affairs within the United States in a timely and meaningful manner
because using other modes of transportation for long-distance travel is neither
efficient nor economical. 0 7 Further, the Court has also recognized that the
ability to reunite with family and friends is an important reason to protect the
freedom of movement because of its large social value.20 8 However, because a
ban on international air travel would act as an almost complete prohibition
against travel abroad, citizens would be virtually deprived of their ability to
reunite with family and friends who live overseas. Therefore, passengers who
are deprived of the right to airline travel could also be denied their ability to
participate in business, scholarly, political or family events.
The passengers' interest in protecting their right to travel from erroneous
deprivation is especially significant in light of the fact that once passengers
have been denied this liberty interest, the government cannot later undo the
deprivation or its effects. °3 In other words, passengers who are deprived of
their freedom to travel, even if for a short time,2"0 cannot regain their lost
liberty even if the government later reinstates the passengers' right because they
have already missed their flight and suffered the stigma of being labeled a high
risk to aviation security.21' This problem has already arisen within the context
206. Kent, 357 U.S. at 126-27 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE CONSTITUTION 195-96 (1956)).
207. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (stating that airline travel provides an
efficient and relatively inexpensive form of travel).
208. Kent, 357 U.S. at 126 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CONSTITUTION 195-96 (1956)).
209. See Shirin Sinnar, Note, Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention of
Aliens Under the USA PATRIOTAct, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1419, 1438 (2003) (proposing that all
deprivations of liberty are substantial because the "deprivation of liberty cannot be undone")
Sinnar compares the deprivation of liberty with property, noting that "while mistakenly
appropriated property can be returned to an individual, the loss of liberty cannot be restored
upon a finding that the decision was in error." Id.
210. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (explaining that when
determining whether due process is triggered, it is the nature of the interest, not the weight, that
is important); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,576 (1975) ("[T]he length and consequent
severity of a deprivation... 'is not decisive of the basic right' to a hearing of some kind."
(citations omitted)). In Goss, the Court found it irrelevant that a student suspended from school
for ten days did not suffer a "severe detriment or grievous loss." Id. at 575. The Court
concluded that while the student's loss was not lengthy or severe, he was nevertheless entitled to
due process prior to the suspension. Id. at 576.
211. In addition to the deprivation of a liberty interest in the right to travel, red-coded
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of the current screening process at airports that compares passengers' identities
to a government "No Fly" list.21 2 There are many reports of citizens being
detained at airports across the country because their name triggers a "match" to
the government's watch list.
213
For example, in 2002, members of Peace Action Wisconsin were tagged
as a terror risk and were prohibited from boarding their flight to Washington,
D.C., for a conference on United States military action in the nation of
Colombia.1 4 Even though government officials later cleared the members of
the group to travel, the Peace Action members, including a nun, a priest, and
several students, had already been deprived of their ability to travel to
Washington, D.C., and as a consequence, missed their conference. 2 '5 With
concerns that the new screening system will actually increase the number of
passengers who are mistakenly assessed as a threat to aviation security, it is
likely that more airline travelers will be subject to a plight similar to that
suffered by the Peace Action Wisconsin Group.216 As such, passengers retain a
significant interest in protecting their right to travel both domestically and
internationally.
passengers who are met at the airport by federal law enforcement agents may also have an
identifiable liberty interest in their reputation that the government infringes. These passengers
are turned over to police in front of other passengers, some of whom may know the passenger
personally. This could cause great embarrassment to the passengers and could damage their
reputation, both professionally and socially. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972) ("'[Wlhere a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."'
(quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971))).
212. See Davis, supra note 32, at A 14 (providing several examples of citizens who have
been wrongly detained at the airports).
213. See id. (explaining situations of passengers wrongly detained at the airports).
214. Id.
215. Id. This example and others raise a concern that passengers may be targeted as a risk
solely because of their involvement in political and anti-war organizations. See id. (describing
concerns "among activists that the government was targeting them [and preventing them from
flying]"). If the CAPPS 11 System prevents people from boarding aircraft in the United States
solely because of their affiliation with certain organizations, this may well give rise to an
unconstitutional infringement of the right to freedom of speech or the right to peaceably
assemble as guaranteed by the First Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall
make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech,.., or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble."). Although such an inquiry would be relevant in determining the constitutionality of
the CAPPS 11 System, the constitutionality of the System is outside the scope of this Note.
216. See Davis, supra note 32, at A14 (stating that there are concerns that the CAPPS II
System will result in more erroneously tagged passengers because CAPPS II will search more
databases than the predecessor system).
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B. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation and the Probable Value of Substitute
Procedural Safeguards in the Current CAPPS II Redress Process
The second prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test consists of an
analysis of the current procedures available to red-coded passengers who wish
to contest their risk assessment.217  This analysis requires two separate
assessments. First, this Note will determine the risk of erroneous deprivation of
the passengers' protected liberty and property interests as result of the current
procedures being used. The second part of the analysis evaluates the probable
value of requiring the government to increase or alter the procedural protections
available to passengers who are mistakenly flagged as terror risks.
1. Failing to Meet the Challenge: Current Redress Procedures and the
Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
Under current regulations, the risk of erroneous deprivation is substantial.
Much of this risk seems to be associated with the first step of the screening
process, verification of passengers' identities, as estimates indicate that the
commercial databases that the System will access to verify the identity of airline
passengers maintain an error rate of almost thirty percent.218 In addition, there
is a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation from the use of government
databases to assess passengers' risk levels because the TSA concedes that it
"has no indication of the accuracy of information contained in government
databases. '0 19  Regardless of the errors that exist in the government and
commercial databases, even if the redesigned CAPPS H System itself maintains
an error rate of two percent-a low estimate 22°--at least 400, and as many as
800, of the 20,000 to 40,000 passengers who are red-flagged each day will be
217. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976) (describing the second prong of
the analysis).
218. See, e.g., LANE COUNTY BILL OF RIGHTS DEFENSE COMMITTEE, CAPPS II, at
http://www.lanerights.org.capps.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) (estimating the error rate of
commercial databases at thirty percent) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
219. GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at I S.
220. The two percent error rate shows that even a small error rate has the potential of
creating big problems. The Washington Times reported that transportation officials estimate the
error rate to be much higher-around four percent. Audrey Hudson, Airline Profiling System
Defended, WASH. TMEs, Feb. 13, 2004, at All. If the error rate is as high as the Washington
Times article reports, at least 800, and as many as 1600, passengers may be mistakenly identified
as a terror risk each day. An error rate this high is also troubling because of the potential
number of passengers who actually do pose a terror risk that will be allowed to board the aircraft
because the System failed to flag them as a high risk to security.
1423
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1385 (2004)
mistakenly identified as a high risk to aviation security.221 Although the TSA
has stated that the number of passengers who are flagged for additional
screening or prohibited from boarding their flights will actually decrease when
the agency implements the System, 222 civil liberties groups, citing the high rate
of error in the databases to be used by CAPPS II, believe that the number of
passengers erroneously flagged and prohibited from flying will actually
increase.---
In addition to the inaccuracy of the information used to make the risk
assessments, the risk of erroneous deprivation is further heightened by the
timing of the notice, leaving passengers without an opportunity to challenge
meaningfully the assessment prior to the deprivation of their interests.
Passengers whom the System determines to be a high risk to aviation security
are not informed of their status until they arrive at the airport to check-in for
their flight. 224 Consequently, the TSA's current redress procedures available to
erroneously assessed passengers are provided only after the passengers have
been denied access to their scheduled flights. Thus, by the time they have an
opportunity to challenge their risk assessment, they have already been deprived
of their liberty and property interests in their particular flight.
Further, even if the TSA provides erroneously deprived passengers with
postdeprivation procedures, the procedures available are limited by the
passengers' lack of access to the data used by the System, and by the TSA's
inability to correct inaccurate information in the databases used to generate the
passengers' risk assessments. 22 ' Although the TSA has stated that it will allow
yellow-coded and red-coded passengers an opportunity to file a complaint
contesting their risk assessment 226 and to appeal to the Department of
221. See Goo, supra note 26, at A01 (stating that the CAPPS 11 System will assess
approximately one to two percent of passengers as high risks to aviation security).
222. See Davis, supra note 32, at A 14 (reporting that "[t]he TSA envisions [CAPPS 11] as
'dramatically reducing' the number of people flagged [for additional screening]").
223. See id. (stating that there are concerns that the CAPPS II System will result in more
erroneously tagged passengers because CAPPS II will search more databases than the
predecessor system).
224. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 7 ("When the passenger checks in for a flight at
the airport, the passengers' risk category will be transmitted from CAPPS 11 to the check-in
counter.").
225. See id. at 26 (citing data access and data correction as two primary problems with the
TSA's redress procedures).
226. See August 1 Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,265, 45,269 (Aug. I, 2003) (stating that
passengers may file a complaint with the passenger advocate). The August I Notice states that
passengers should file a written complaint with the CAPPS II passenger advocate if they wish to
contest their records, but it offers no information on how long any search of the records by the
passenger advocate may take. Id. Even if the passenger advocate is able to locate an error in the
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Homeland Security Privacy Office,227 the passengers may bring complaints
based only on information they obtained from their records,228 making it
extremely difficult for passengers to challenge successfully an erroneous risk
assessment.2 29 This difficulty is due, in large part, to the fact that the TSA,
citing national security concerns, will prevent passengers from gaining access
to the information in government databases that the System uses in conducting
risk assessments.210 Passengers therefore would be limited to accessing only
information that they provided to the airlines when purchasing their ticket-
their name, address, phone number, and birth date.23' The lack of information
available to passengers is likely to result in a high rate of erroneous deprivation
as this information will give the passengers little, if any, insight into why the
System assessed them as a high risk to aviation security.
In addition to passengers' inability to obtain the information necessary to
adequately challenge their risk assessment, the passengers will have great
difficulty, under the current System, in correcting any erroneous information
that led to the mistaken risk assessment.232 The TSA acknowledges that finding
errors in the databases and correcting them may be problematic. 233 This
difficulty is due in large part to the fact that the redesigned CAPPS II System
will preserve a passenger's information for only a "short period after the
completion" of the person's travel itinerary.234 Although limiting the amount of
time the data is retained.aids in the protection of passengers' privacy, it will
passengers' records, the advocate lacks the authority to rectify incorrect information contained
in the government or commercial databases. GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 16.
227. GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 25. Neither the Notices nor the GAO Report explain
the process of appealing to the DHS Privacy Office, except to say that passengers may file a
complaint with the office. Id. at 25; August 1 Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,269.
228. August 1 Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,269.
229. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (explaining that passengers will only
be able to access the records that they provided when purchasing their ticket).
230. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (stating that the information in the
databases will remain confidential).
231. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (explaining that passengers will have access
to their records which contain only their name, address, phone number and birth date); see also
GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 26 (noting that "TSA officials stated that passengers will not
have access to any government data" and that the TSA has not yet determined if passengers will
have access to the information contained in commercial databases).
232. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 26 (expressing concerns over TSA's ability to
correct erroneous information).
233. See id. ("TSA documents and program officials stated that it may be difficult for the
Passenger Advocate to identify errors.").
234. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, CAPPS I1: Myths and Facts, at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3163 (Feb. 13, 2004) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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make it very difficult for passengers to identify any erroneous information
which may have led to their mistaken risk assessment. 235 Even if passengers
find erroneous information, the TSA's lack of authority to correct any mistakes
in the databases increases the probability that passengers will be erroneously
deprived of their protected interests.236
The redress options currently available to red-coded passengers
inadequately protect those passengers from erroneous deprivation. Even
though the TSA provides passengers with an opportunity to file a complaint
seeking to identify incorrect information, the lack of access and the inability to
change inaccurate data render the redress procedures minimally, if at all,
effective.237 The most troubling aspect of the current redress process, however,
is that passengers whom the government prohibits from flying are not notified
of this decision until they arrive at the airport, thus denying those passengers of
any meaningful challenge to the risk assessment prior to the deprivation of their
identifiable liberty and property interests.
2. Stepping Up to the Challenge: The Probable Value ofAdditional or
Substitute Procedural Safeguards
The second prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge test also calls for an
assessment of the probable value of any additional or substitute procedures
231before the deprivation of the passengers' liberty and property interests. In
making this assessment, it is important to recall that the Mathews Court
explained that "[t]he essence of due process is the requirement that 'a person in
jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and
opportunity to meet it.' 239 As discussed above, red-coded passengers do not
receive notice of their risk assessment until they arrive at the airport to check in
for their flight, 240 and even then, the notice does not inform the passengers of
235. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 26 (emphasizing that "the short retention period
might make it impossible for passengers to seek redress if they do not register complaints
quickly").
236. See id. at 16 (noting that the "TSA does not have the authority to correct erroneous
data in commercial or governmental databases").
237. See id. at 25 (discussing redress procedures available under CAPPS 11).
238. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing that the second
prong of the analysis includes an assessment of the "probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards").
239. Id. at 348-49 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,171-72
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
240. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (explaining that the CAPPS 11 risk
assessment is not transmitted to the airlines until passengers check in for their flight).
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the case against them. As such, red-coded passengers will be detained at the
airport, deprived of their property interest in their airline ticket and seat, and
deprived of their liberty interest in their right to travel.
The probable value of requiring the government to afford notice to the
passengers prior to their arrival at the airport is substantial. Providing notice of
a high-risk, or red-coded, assessment at the time passengers reserve their plane
ticket would allow those passengers who believe that their risk assessment is
erroneous to file a complaint prior to their scheduled departure date. While this
notice may not be of great value to passengers who book their flights at the last
241minute, predeprivation notice would have a significant value to passengers
who book their flights days or weeks in advance.242 Given that the Department
of Homeland Security acknowledges that the prescreening process can be
completed in as little as five seconds,243 the government could provide notice of
the risk assessment almost instantly, thereby allowing passengers with an
erroneous risk assessment to immediately file a complaint with the TSA.
Although difficulties plague the complaint process, early notice of the risk
assessment would at least provide passengers with an opportunity to attempt to
correct any mistakes that could have led to the erroneous risk assessment. At
the very least, requiring the government to provide notice at an earlier time
would allow passengers, at least those traveling within the United States, to
arrange alternate transportation in order to arrive at their destination on time.
In addition to meaningful notice, due process generally requires a hearing
prior to the deprivation of protected interests. 244 Under the current redress
procedures, however, red-coded passengers are not offered a predeprivation
241. Because the TSA requires a written complaint to be filed, it is unlikely that passengers
who purchase their tickets within a few days of their flight will be able to correct any erroneous
information that may lead to their high risk assessment before their scheduled departure date.
See August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg, 45,265,45,269 (Aug. 1, 2003) (requiring passengers to file a
written complaint if they challenge their risk assessment).
242. Many passengers purchase their airline tickets at least several days in advance. In
2002, international travelers purchased their airline tickets an average of 47.8 days in advance.
ITA OFFICE OF TRAVEL AND ToUIsM INDUSTRIES, 2002 Profile of U.S. Resident Traveler
Visiting Overseas Destinations Reported From: Survey of International Air Travelers, at
http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/view/f-2002-101-001/index.html?i cart cookie=20040228.223841.051
71 (posted July 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
243. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: CAPPS II at a Glance,
at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/displaycontent-3162 (Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter CAPPS II
at a Glance] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
244. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (finding that a hearing is
required prior to the deprivation of liberty and property interests); see also Friendly, supra note
123, at 1267 (emphasizing that "some kind of hearing is required ... before a person is finally
deprived" of his liberty and property interests (quoting Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,557-
58 (1974)).
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hearing. The only predeprivation "procedure" that the government offers
passengers is questioning by appropriate law enforcement officials.24 5 Yet,
there is no indication that these law enforcement officials will have access to
the information which led to the passengers' risk assessment or, even if they do,
that they will offer the evidence to the passengers. Without access to this
information, passengers are denied a meaningful opportunity to present their
side of the story. Further, because the police questioning occurs after the
passengers are denied their boarding passes, thus depriving them of their liberty
and property interests, the police questioning is not truly a predeprivation
safeguard.
Providing a hearing prior to the passengers' arrival at the airport would
give the passengers an opportunity to hear any evidence against them and to
challenge any erroneous information before they are deprived of their property
and liberty interests. While a predeprivation hearing would significantly
decrease the risk of erroneous deprivation, this additional safeguard seems to be
impractical given the relatively small time frame between the passengers'
purchase of their ticket and the departure date. Similarly, providing a hearing
at the airport for passengers who are notified of their risk assessment upon
check-in seems unfeasible due to the short time available and the potentially
large number of passengers who will be entitled to a hearing. Even if a
predeprivation hearing is not feasible, however, there may be other
predeprivation procedures available that could decrease the risk of erroneous
deprivation. For example, the System could conduct a second risk assessment
for those passengers who are identified as a high risk by the first assessment. It
is possible that erroneous information could have been included in the first
computation of the passengers' risk level, and that a second entry of the
information would correct any erroneous information entered during the first
computation. Thus, the probable value of this additional safeguard would be
significant.
If a predeprivation hearing is not possible, there must be an adequate
postdeprivation remedy available to red-coded passengers.246 Although a
245. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 7 (explaining that passengers who are red-coded
may be subject to questioning at the airport).
246. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981), overruled on other grounds by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (rejecting "the proposition that 'at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner' always requires the State to provide a hearing prior to the initial
deprivation of property"); see also Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive
Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill ofRights, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 833,876-77
(2003) (discussing postdeprivation hearings). Professor Rubin explains that in procedural due
process cases:
[T]he 'constitutional violation.., is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is
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postdeprivation hearing obviously would follow the initial deprivation of the
interests-that is, after passengers are first denied their right to board a plane-
such a hearing would at least ensure that erroneously deprived passengers are
not permanently deprived of their liberty interest in their right to travel.
Because red-coded passengers may continue to be assessed as a high risk to
aviation security as long as any erroneous information about the passengers
remains in the databases, a postdeprivation hearing is critical to make certain
that the government does not continue to deprive these passengers of their right
to future travel because of erroneous information.
Although the probable value of providing erroneously deprived passengers
with a postdeprivation evidentiary hearing is significant, the benefits of such
process will be limited by the passengers' inability to gain access to the
erroneous information contained in the databases used in the risk assessment.
247
Identifying and correcting the errors is dependent upon the government making
the passengers' records available for review, an unlikely occurrence under
current government policies. 248 The TSA has emphasized that red-coded
passengers will not have access to information contained in either the
commercial databases accessed or the government's classified databases,249 and
has acknowledged that the passenger advocate is likely to have difficulty
locating any errors that may have caused the erroneous assessment. 2 5 Thus,
for any postdeprivation procedures to be meaningful, they must include access
to the information that triggered the high-risk assessment. The lack of access,
along with difficulty in identifying errors, only underscores the substantial risk
of erroneous deprivation and the need for additional safeguards, including
not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process.' In this, and
only this, class of cases, the Court explained, might the availability of a state
postdeprivation remedy serve to prevent a deprivation of liberty or property from
violating the Clause.
Id. (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990)).
247. GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 26; see also August I Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,265,
45,269 (Aug. 1, 2003) (describing the redress procedures). But see Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898-99 (1961) (holding that denying an employee of a private
contractor access to a military base that was the site of her employment for security reasons did
not violate requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, even though she
was neither advised of the specific grounds for her exclusion nor given a hearing).
248. For an overview of the Bush Administration's policies supporting classifying
documents as "secret, in the interests of national security," see generally John Podesta, Need to
Know: Governing in Secret, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM 220, 221 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003).
249. GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 26.
250. Id.
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predeprivation notice and an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing where the
government would confront the passengers with the evidence against them.
C. The Governmental Interests
The third, and final, prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test is the
analysis of the government's interest in avoiding further due process
procedures. 251 Although the governmental interests include "the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail, 2 52 the government's primary interest in preserving the current
redress procedures is protecting the nation from future terrorist threats.
September 11 threatened the security of the United States in a way that it had
never before experienced.253 The government suddenly was confronted with an
enemy who walked freely among the citizens of the United States and exploited
the very freedoms upon which this country was founded.254 Because terrorists
blend in with law-abiding American citizens and are often hard to identify, the
government has faced unique challenges in developing new safety measures
that would prevent future terror attacks using commercial aircraft.
The congressional mandate requiring the TSA to develop a system that
screens all airline passengers is a part of the solution that attempts to meet the
challenge of identifying terrorists who have immersed themselves into
American life.255 Congress recognized that to distinguish terrorists from law-
251. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
252. Id.
253. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.htnl
(Sept. 20, 2001) (speaking to the nation about the September 11 attacks) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). In his Address, President Bush explained:
Americans have known wars-but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on
foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties
of war-but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans
have known surprise attacks-but never before on thousands of civilians. All of
this was brought upon us in a single day--and night fell on a different world, a
world where freedom itself is under attack.
Id.
254. See Evan Thomas & Mark Hosenball, Bush: 'We're At War', NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24,
200 1, at 30-33 (explaining that the September I I terrorists had blended into their communities).
The article states that "[t]he pattern of bin Laden's terrorism is to insert operatives into a
country where they are 'sleepers,' burrowed deep into the local culture, leading normal lives
while awaiting orders." Id. at 33.
255. The redesigned CAPPS II System is only one part of the comprehensive program that
the government has implemented in the wake of September 11 aimed at increasing aviation
1430
RED FLAGGING DUE PROCESS
abiding American citizens, the names of each passenger must be checked
against a "coordinated list comprised of criminal, national security, intelligence
and INS information. 2 6 Indeed, identifying potential terrorists and preventing
recreation of the events of September 11 was the stated purpose of the CAPPS
II System. 257 The Department of Homeland Security explains that the System
"will seek to authenticate travelers' identities and perform risk assessments to
detect individuals who may pose a terrorist-related threat or who have
outstanding Federal or state warrants for crimes of violence. " 28  Ensuring
national security was clearly the impetus in creation of the CAPPS II System,
and it will surely remain the focus of the program regardless of how it is
reshaped, repackaged, or renamed.
The broad government interest in protecting national security weighs
heavily against the passengers' liberty and property interests. 25 9 However, the
government interest should not be measured in terms of the broad concern for
national security. Instead, the government interests should be characterized
more narrowly "as the interests in security and efficiency that are served by the
absence of additional procedures."26  The interests to be considered are the
fiscal and national security burdens that are brought about by the additional
safeguards of a meaningful predeprivation notice and an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing allowing red-coded passengers to be confronted with the
evidence against them.
Providing notice to red-coded passengers at the time the passengers
purchase their airline tickets would result in only a negligible fiscal and
administrative burden. Under current procedures, the government already
provides notice to red-coded passengers when they arrive at the airport.
Concededly, some additional costs may be incurred in furnishing passengers
with notice at the time of purchase, such as cost of mailing notices to
passengers and the administrative burdens of training airline reservation agents
security. As part of this program, Congress also transferred the control of all airport screening to
the federal government, Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71 § 101,
115 Stat. 597, 597 (2001), increased the number of air marshals on commercial flights, § 105,
115 Stat. at 606-08, and improved flight deck security. § 104, 115 Stat. at 605-06.
256. 147 CONG. REc. S9583 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
257. CAPPS 11 at a Glance, supra note 243.
258. Id.
259. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) ("It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation." (quoting Aptheker v.
Sec. of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964))).
260. Sinnar, supra note 209, at 1440; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976)
(explaining that the governmental interest includes the burdens additional process would bring
about).
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in informing passengers of their risk assessment and possible redress
procedures. These administrative and fiscal costs, however, are offset by a
reduction in the costs incurred in dispatching law enforcement officers to meet
passengers at the airport. In addition, because the System retains passengers'
data until after the completion of the passengers' itinerary, providing notice at
the time the passengers purchase their airline tickets will increase the
probability that the TSA can better assist passengers in locating and correcting
any incorrect information that may have led to the passengers' erroneous risk
assessment.
Although the administrative and fiscal burdens of providing notice at the
time of the ticket purchase are negligible, the government has a persuasive
argument that the threat to national security would be increased if earlier notice
is required. It seems that the System relies on a certain "surprise" element in
apprehending suspected terrorists at the airport. Thus, the government has a
viable argument that notifying red-coded passengers of their risk assessment
prior to their arrival at the airport would tip terrorists off and allow them to
make other plans if the terrorists know that they will not be able to fly in
advance. But, because the sole purpose of CAPPS HI, and now Secure Flight, is
to keep terrorists off of commercial airliners, this argument does not hold much
weight.
Providing notice to red-coded passengers before they arrive to check-in for
their flight not only keeps potential terrorists from the airport, but also gives the
government the opportunity to verify the location of, and possibly apprehend,
known terrorists at an earlier date. Certainly, the government's interest in
national security would be equally, if not better, served by identifying and
apprehending suspected terrorists before they arrive at the airport. Even if the
government provides earlier notice to red-coded passengers, the government
still may deny boarding passes to those passengers who were unable to remedy
their erroneous assessment prior to their flight. Requiring the government to
provide passengers with notice of their risk assessment at an earlier time does
not prevent the government from preventing red-coded passengers from flying.
Instead, it simply gives those passengers notice of their risk assessment and an
opportunity to attempt to correct any information that they believe may have led
to their erroneous assessment prior to their arrival at the airport.
In addition to meaningful notice, a further safeguard to protect red-coded
passengers against erroneous deprivation is providing these passengers with a
meaningful hearing whereby they would have an opportunity to confront the
evidence against them. A predeprivation hearing, while likely to decrease the
risk of erroneous deprivation, would require the government to provide
hearings in an extremely short period of time, resulting in a significant
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administrative burden. Although it is certainly plausible that the government
could develop a redress process that allows passengers to challenge an
erroneous risk assessment in a meaningful manner prior to their scheduled
flight, this seems highly improbable for two reasons: (1) the significant number
of cases to be heard, and (2) the TSA may have neither access to the databases
nor authority to change any incorrect information.26' However, because the risk
assessment takes only five seconds to complete,262 the government could, with
negligible financial and administrative burdens, conduct an additional
assessment for red-coded passengers in order to verify that the first computation
of the passengers' risk assessment was correct.
Even if it is implausible to provide red-coded passengers with a
predeprivation hearing or other procedural safeguards, the government may still
be required to provide these passengers with an opportunity to be heard
following the initial deprivation of their interests. Although passengers will
have already been divested of their property and liberty interests in their missed
flight, a postdeprivation hearing will protect against further deprivation of their
interests. Providing this additional safeguard would not prevent the
government from blocking passengers that pose a legitimate threat to national
security from flying; rather, a postdeprivation hearing would simply allow
passengers an opportunity to present their side and to hear the government's
reasons for assessing them as a high risk to aviation security.
Although the government has an important interest in protecting national
security, this interest is not sufficiently burdened by requiring a postdeprivation
hearing and is outweighed by the importance of protecting against a continued
and erroneous deprivation of red-coded passengers' liberty and property
interests. Further, any burden placed on the government's interest in limiting
passengers' access to the data used in conducting the risk assessments does not
tip the scales back in favor of the government. The TSA has stated that
national security concerns prevent the agency from allowing passengers to view
information contained in government databases. 6 3 Even if the government's
interest in safeguarding national security may substantiate preventing
passengers whom the government suspects as having ties to terrorist
organizations from viewing classified evidence against them, the government
should not have a blanket policy of nondisclosure of evidence against red-
coded passengers. Instead, the government should be required to make the
261. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 16 (explaining that the "TSA does not have the
authority to correct erroneous data in commercial or government databases").
262. CAPPS H at a Glance, supra note 243.
263. GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 26.
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argument for nondisclosure on a case-by-case basis. This requirement would
safeguard national security concerns in cases involving persons whom the
government perceives to represent a legitimate threat to national security while
allowing passengers who are able to show that they have no ties to terrorist
organizations an opportunity to locate and correct any erroneous information in
the government and commercial databases. Therefore, the government's
interest in national security is not unreasonably burdened by allowing
passengers an opportunity to be heard and to confront the evidence against
them.
I. Conclusion
Although safeguarding the nation against future terror attacks continues to
be at the forefront of political discourse, fears of terrorism should not
undermine the Constitution's protection of the freedoms and liberties upon
which this nation was founded. Indeed, the nation's most powerful response to
the terrorists should be the protection of the very freedoms that they sought to
destroy.2u Yet a fundamental concern arises as new security measures push
aside these freedoms. As Justice O'Connor posited in the weeks after
September 11, "At what point does the cost to civil liberties from legislation
designed to prevent terrorism outweigh the added security that that legislation
provides?" 265 Three years after September 11, the question still remains, at
what point do national security concerns outweigh the interest of Americans in
protecting their civil liberties and other constitutionally protected rights?
Even though the now redesigned CAPPS II System is an apprehensible,
and perhaps even necessary, response to the terror attacks of September 11, it
must not be implemented in such a way that innocent Americans, those whom
the System was created to protect, are deprived of their liberty and property
without due process of the law. Although the government has now recognized
that the CAPPS II System as originally envisioned does not ensure that
Americans' privacy interests will be protected,266 the government has failed
264. See Richard C. Leone& Greg Arnig, Jr.,Forewordto THE WARON OuR FREEDOMS, at
ix, x (Richard C. Leone & Greg Amig, Jr. eds., 2003) ("We must resolve that it is an essential
part of winning the war on our freedoms to insist that we keep intact the civil liberties and other
freedoms that we have gained in 225 years. That must be freedom's answer to the terrorists.").
265. Linda Greenhouse, A Nation Challenged: The Supreme Court: In New York Visit,
O'Connor Foresees Limits on Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at B5.
266. See Goo, supra note 95, at ElO (stating that the TSA plans to reshape the CAPPS Il
System "in order to address privacy concerns raised by U.S. Airlines, political leaders and
advocacy groups").
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thus far to acknowledge that this System does not adequately protect due
process rights of American citizens. Thus, even the repackaged CAPPS II
System will fail the constitutional challenge unless the government implements
safeguards that will adequately protect the due process rights of its citizens.
It is clear that the impetus behind the creation of the CAPPS II System
was to protect the country from another terror attack employing the use of
commercial airliners. Yet, even when the government seeks to restrict the civil
liberties or property interests of Americans because of national security
concerns, these restrictions must be enacted within the bounds of due
process.267 Thus, because airline passengers maintain both an identifiable
liberty interest in their right to travel and an identifiable property interest in
their airline ticket and the particular seat that it guarantees, the government may
not infringe upon those interests without providing the affected passengers with
appropriate procedural due process safeguards. The current redress procedures
that the TSA provides to erroneously detained passengers under the System,
however, fail to adequately protect the affected interests of those passengers
and as such, do not conform to the requirements of the Due Process Clause.
To meet the demands of procedural due process, the TSA must provide
passengers with three additional procedural safeguards. First, to improve the
accuracy of the risk assessments, the redesigned CAPPS II System should
conduct a second risk assessment for those passengers who are red-flagged
during the initial assessment. The second computation may yield a different
result from the initial assessment. If this occurs, the government should
calculate the passengers' risk score a third time. Only those passengers whose
scores yield a high risk assessment at least two of the three times should be
prohibited from flying. The addition of this safeguard is likely to decrease the
number of erroneous risk assessments while resulting in only a negligible
burden on the government.
Second, instead of instructing airlines to inform passengers of their risk
assessment when they arrive to check-in for their flight, the TSA must afford
red-coded passengers notice of their risk assessment prior to their arrival at the
airport. The government should instruct airlines to inform red-coded
passengers of their risk assessment at the time the passengers purchase their
ticket. If, however, immediate notice over the telephone is not plausible, the
TSA should promptly provide notice by mail. For those passengers who order
their tickets over the Internet or through travel agencies, the government could
provide notice in one of several ways, including providing a number on the
267. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.").
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internet sites or with the travel agencies that passengers could call to find out
their risk assessment or notifying the passengers by mail within a certain
number of days from the purchase of their tickets. Providing earlier notice to
red-coded passengers would allow those passengers the opportunity to
challenge immediately their assessment and attempt to rectify any incorrect
information that may have led to their erroneous risk assessment.
Finally, the TSA must provide red-coded passengers with a meaningful
postdeprivation hearing whereby passengers are confronted with the evidence
against them and given an opportunity to present their side of the case.
Although the government has a legitimate national security concern in limiting
passengers' access to classified information, the government should not have a
general policy of refusal to disclose such information. Rather, the government
should be required to make the argument for why information should not be
disclosed to passengers on a case-by-case basis. Providing access to the data
used for risk assessment would ensure that passengers who are able to show
that they have no ties to terror groups are allowed to confront the evidence
against them, while also protecting the government's ability to limit access by
those passengers whom the government perceives to be a legitimate threat to
national security.
Even though aviation security has now become a legitimate national
security concern,268 the government's appeal to such concerns should not
equate to a carte blanche for depriving American citizens of their protected
interests without the due process of the law. As Justice Marshall explained,
procedural due process is "our fundamental guarantee of fairness [and] our
protection against arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable government action.
269
To meet the constitutional challenge and to protect against the erroneous
deprivation of the liberty and property interests of airline passengers, the
government, before implementing the redesigned CAPPS II System, should be
required to integrate the additional procedural safeguards described above with
the already existing redress procedures. The implementation of these
safeguards will ensure that the screening system maintains a proper balance
between securing the nation and preserving those freedoms that the hijackers
sought to destroy on September 11.
268. See CONG. REC. S9583 (daily ed. Sept. 21,2001) (statement of Sen. Kerry) ("Airport
security is also a matter of national security.").
269. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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